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ABSTRACT 
Mayors and governors who represent high threat, high population density 
urban areas need strategic, decision-making advantages and, as such, should be 
significant users of fusion centers. These chief executives desire to understand 
the operating environment for their jurisdictions where daily risks and threats 
emerge from the complexities of an integrated world. Paradoxically, as will be 
outlined through this thesis, there is a lack of robust engagement between fusion 
centers and mayors and governors. While this thesis does not suggest 
executives know nothing about their fusion centers, the lack of direct and regular 
engagement is problematic given that top elected officials are responsible for 
leadership and funding decisions that prevent, mitigate, and respond to threats to 
their jurisdictions. Without engagement, fusion centers struggle to meet executive 
expectations, and mayors and governors miss critical opportunities to leverage 
their fusion centers. By addressing this engagement and expectations gap, 
fusion centers will be better situated to help these busy chief executives develop 
adaptive long-term strategic approaches for preventing, preparing, responding to 
and mitigating threats and all hazards in their jurisdictions, where they ultimately 
are held accountable by their constituency. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided the impetus for 
development of fusion centers by localities and states to address the void in 
terrorism information and intelligence sharing between local, regional, state, and 
federal entities. Since then, local, regional, and state fusion centers have 
evolved, with many focusing on all crimes and others serving as all crimes and all 
hazards one-stop shops providing information and services to a wider audience 
beyond the law enforcement community.   
Mayors and governors who represent high threat, high population density 
urban areas need strategic decision-making advantages and, as such, should be 
significant users of fusion centers.  These chief executives desire to understand 
the operating environment for their jurisdictions where daily risks and threats 
emerge from the complexities of an integrated world.  This setting, where the 
confluence of security and emerging threats often intersect with politics and 
limited resources, is where mayors and governors often find a maelstrom of 
activities requiring their ability to understand and adapt to the environmental 
context and to calibrate their actions accordingly.   
The first objective of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is the 
prevention and disruption of terrorists attacks (2007).  According to the Strategy, 
intelligence, developed from multiple sources of information, is a key aspect to 
the prevention of attacks, and mitigation of disaster impacts. Rollins and Connors 
(2007) explain, “the primary responsibility of today’s fusion centers is still to 
ensure that state and local leadership is knowledgeable about current and 
emerging trends that threaten the security of relevant jurisdictions” (p. 4). 
Thus, the overarching goal of the fusion center should be to help the 
decision maker prepare for the challenges posed by the city or state operating 
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environment.  Paradoxically, as will be outlined through this thesis, there is a lack 
of robust engagement between fusion centers and local and state chief 
executives.  While this thesis does not suggest executives know nothing about 
their fusion centers, the lack of direct and regular engagement is problematic 
given that top elected officials are responsible for leadership and funding 
decisions that prevent, mitigate, and respond to threats to their jurisdictions.  
Without engagement, fusion centers struggle to meet executive expectations, 
and mayors and governors miss critical opportunities to leverage the potential 
capabilities that exist within fusion centers.  By addressing this engagement and 
expectations gap, fusion centers will be better situated to help these busy chief 
executives develop adaptive long-term strategic approaches for preventing, 
preparing, responding to and mitigating threats and all hazards in their 
jurisdictions, where they ultimately are held accountable by their constituency.  
Since 9/11, fusion centers have evolved to its current nascent stage.  Over 
$340 million federal funds have been invested, and over 70 fusion centers have 
been established nationwide (Napolitano, 2009).  Localities and states have also 
invested significant amounts of local and state federal funds in their fusion 
centers, including staff, facilities, and technology (Rollins, 2008).  During 
economically challenging times, federal funding for fusion centers may be 
threatened, further forcing cash-strapped mayors and governors to decide the 
fate of their fusion centers.  If fusion centers are of no value to mayors and 
governors, then they may not receive funding and political support (Eack, 2008).  
If executive non-engagement continues, then the next evolutionary phase for 
fusion centers may be their demise. 
This thesis aims to gain a better understanding of mayors’ and governors’ 
experiences with their fusion centers as the primary leaders accountable to their 
constituencies.  This research examines how mayors and governors, and their 
fusion centers, can mutually benefit from engaging each other.  Additional 
research will help provide recommendations on developing a robust mutual 
engagement.  The desired outcome of this thesis is to emphasize the primary 
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roles mayors and governors have in homeland security. Just like the late 
Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill who said that all politics is local, all homeland 
security is also local (O’Neill & Hymel, 1994). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis posits that the overarching goal of the fusion center should be 
to help prepare key decision makers to effectively govern in the complex 
operating environment of the city or state.1  Thus, the primary research question 
is: Are fusion centers meeting the needs and expectations of mayors and 
governors?  The primary purpose of this research is to find out if and how mayors 
and governors are gaining value from their fusion centers.  As the key decision 
makers and highest-ranking elected officials in their jurisdictions, mayors and 
governors manage the finite resources available for the daily protection of their 
citizens, and, ultimately, the advancement of the nation’s security.  They are 
empowered by their elected office to frame policies and to change government 
actions.  This thesis will attempt to: 
1. Identify what mayors and governors are gaining from their fusion 
centers. 
2. Explain what mayors and governors want from their fusion centers. 
3. Explore ways for mayors and governors to effectively use their 
fusion centers. 
4. Provide recommendations to improve the value of fusion centers to 
mayors and governors. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH   
This research will contribute to literature that currently lacks the 
perspective of the executive as an end user of fusion center services.  The level 
of engagement between chief executives and fusion centers, and the value 
                                            
1
 This overarching goal does not obviate the operational and tactical spectrum of intelligence 
that a fusion center should be capable of delivering to all departments of government and their 
component organizations.  
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derived from such engagement, are undocumented.  Fusion centers, much like 
federal intelligence agencies, should receive guidance from the policy makers 
they support. Precious resources and energy may be wasted or misdirected 
without this guidance (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008).  Gookins (2008) and Lowenthal 
(2006) both assert that policy makers need to be involved in the intelligence 
development cycle because mayors and governors are effectively on the 
domestic frontline of defending the nation.   
Fusion centers, as a local, regional, and state capability for gathering, 
assessing, and sharing information and intelligence, for preventing man-caused 
incidents, serve as a key role in the National Strategy for Information Sharing 
(White House, 2007).  Mayors and governors will be in better positions to 
strategize, plan, and prioritize their limited resources, and be adaptive when they 
have actionable intelligence that is relevant to their region.  Chief executives are 
generalists who are familiar with their government’s operations and resources, 
understand the pulse of the community and their constituency, and have the 
political means to navigate and negotiate.  They understand the need to strike a 
balance between the sometimes extreme and costly security measures against 
an abiding public interest, for privacy and free expression.  These top, elected 
officials also have the capacity to elevate issues and frame discussions, in ways 
that are salient to the citizens of their jurisdictions. 
This research will provide insights to executive perspectives on their 
fusion centers and services, and offer ways to help improve their mutual 
engagement.  Future research efforts should be able to build on this exploratory 
research as an initial understanding of the executive as the end user, examine 
the efforts to help fusion centers meet the needs and expectations of mayors and 
governors, and identify ways for fusion centers to engage them.  Finally, this 
research on local and state executive perspectives will help inform future 
development of local, regional, and state fusion centers. 
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D. ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE, AND 
CHALLENGES 
For purposes of this research, intelligence is not raw data or information 
that has not been analyzed, it is defined as “information that meets the stated or 
understood needs of policy makers” (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 2).  Therefore, policy 
requirements need to be established and a synthesis of information into distilled 
intelligence is necessary to support the policy maker.   
Although fusion centers are still evolving and maturing, they have the 
potential to provide mayors and governors with information and intelligence on 
and visibility of emerging issues such as threat patterns, events and issues of 
interest, and long-term concerns such as critical infrastructure vulnerabilities 
including the electrical grid, water security and public transportation systems, etc.  
Fusion center capabilities, if leveraged appropriately by engaged mayors and 
governors, should ultimately help mayors and governors be better informed when 
they shape strategic policies and budget decisions. Therefore, mayors and 
governors should have a vital role in all parts of the intelligence process and be 
actively engaging their fusion centers. 
Extensive literature on fusion centers thus far has focused on the internal 
processes.  Very little is known about mayors’ and governors’ knowledge of 
fusion center capabilities and levels of satisfaction with products and services.  
State and local chief executives are not known as traditional consumers of 
intelligence.  However, mayors and governors need to have visibility into their 
fusion centers’ capabilities, products, and services in order to better leverage 
these resources to serve their needs.  If mayors and governors identify what they 
want to know, fusion centers will be better able to develop the products and 
services to satisfy their requirements.  Fusion centers are predominantly geared 
toward the needs of frontline law enforcement. This is not surprising owing to the 




enforcement agencies.  With few exceptions, mayors and governors do not have 
insight to fusion capabilities, and fusion centers do not have the opportunity to 
receive guidance and feedback from the executive.   
Active engagement by mayors and governors in the intelligence process 
may cause some concern with the potential for political manipulation of 
intelligence.  This fear is exemplified in the Bush Administration’s decision to 
invade Iraq, despite weak weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat 
intelligence, and citing of selective and questionable sources to justify decisions.  
The danger of intelligence exploitation for political purposes is also possible at 
the local and state levels.  Johnson and Wirtz identified three different ways that 
policy makers could inadvertently, or purposefully, influence intelligence 
development when engaging analysts (2004).  Policy makers should be cautious 
of giving the impression they are exerting pressure for certain findings, indicating 
favoritism towards particular types of analyses, and allowing professional 
advancement based on mediocre work (Johnson & Wirtz, 2004).   
Mark Lowenthal’s Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy describes the first 
phase of the intelligence development process as identifying requirements or the 
type of information the consumer needs (2006, p. 54).  Processes for chief 
executives to receive performance metrics, and to provide feedback and 
guidance, are familiar within many executive offices.  For example, many large 
cities developed data-driven programs to help identify deficiencies in their 
services, which provided chief executives the opportunity to respond with tactical 
improvements or strategic policy changes.  New York City Police Department 
developed the Compstat program in the 1990s, Baltimore City created CitiStat in 
2000 to focus on city services, and Washington, DC designed CapStat in 2007 to 
improve government performance and services.  Through these data-driven 
accountability programs, chief executives are provided the tools to identify 
problem areas, and develop new strategies and policies, for meeting desired 
outcomes.  Performance indicators and metrics based on a foundation of 
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executive level requirements for the fusion center should add to executives’ 
effectiveness in evaluating and providing feedback. 
Some may argue that mayors and governors should not be direct 
consumers of fusion products, because fusion centers are primarily run by law 
enforcement, and are geared towards the law enforcement community.  A 2008 
survey of five California fusion centers show that majority of customers were 
identified as law enforcement personnel (Nenneman, 2008).  However, many 
fusion centers are evolving towards an all-hazards focus, and their products 
serve a wider community of emergency responders, public health, and fire 
departments.  According to the 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Report for Congress on fusion centers, “A little more than 40% of fusion centers 
interviewed described their center as all-hazards as well as all crimes” (Rollins, p. 
22).   
The Fusion Center Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), 
however, notes the need to recognize the political climate of the region where 
fusion centers are located and the importance of creating a working relationship 
with political officials and policy makers.  Mayors and governors often are the 
public face of the government response to disasters and emergency incidents 
and on the receiving end of public scrutiny for failed government actions.  Rather 
than wait until the need to respond to an incident, executives should be able to 
leverage predictive information from fusion centers to help them become 
proactive in addressing challenges to security and safety.   
Establishing awareness of issues in advance is a common practice for 
local and state chief executives.  Mayors and governors typically meet daily with 
staff on policy, operational, budget, political, and community issues, and 
continuously assess if government services are efficient, while providing their 
staff feedback on what they want to know about or understand.  In essence, chief 
executive staffs create their own method of information collection and, in advising 
mayors and governors, derive their own analysis based on dynamic piecemeal 
information from open sources and informal information sharing.  This is akin to 
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the intelligence cycle that includes planning and direction, collection 
requirements, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback.  
Ultimately, this executive process helps to inform mayors and governors when 
they make policy and budget decisions.   
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
As outlined in this introductory chapter, the main focus of this thesis is on 
the executive perspective and experience with their fusion centers.  Chapter II 
summarizes the literature reviewed for this research, confirms a lack of available 
literature and data on executive engagement with fusion centers, and 
underscores the dearth of information related to gauging executives’ experiences 
and satisfaction with their fusion centers.  It also sets the context for Chapter III in 
the research design and methodology used to capture the views of this key 
decision-making group.   
Chapter IV encapsulates the interview results from senior level officials, 
who serve as executive agents, and are most engaged with fusion centers.  
Highlights of their responses to each question can be found in the appendices. 
Drawing from the generalized interview responses, which identify the need 
for fusion centers to better understand the role of the executive, Chapter V 
provides: an overview of the role of mayors and governors, their need for 
situational awareness and sense making, their methods and measures for 
developing that knowledge, the critical importance of risk and crisis 
communications as high-profile elected officials, and the significance of trust 
internally within the government and externally with the public.   
Chapter VI examines the realities of how raw, unvetted information is often 
used to inform chief executives, and the inadequacies of it, how fusion centers 
can add value by providing a strategic decision-making advantage to chief 
executives, so they can avoid strategic surprise in the future, and a brief  
 
 9
discussion on how local and state authorities view the federal control of access to 
information as further widening the information sharing gap between federal and 
local and state authorities.   
Exploratory interviews with key senior personnel, as representatives of the 
executive, led to further understanding in Chapter VII of how executive staff 
members prepare the key decision maker. A prominent example is the 
Presidential Daily Briefing at the federal level, and the instrumental role of key 
staffers.    
The value proposition of fusion centers for mayors and governors is 
offered in Chapter VIII, through a strategy canvas, and recommendations are 
made for sustaining their value with engaged chief executives.  Finally, Chapter 
IX offers concluding thoughts on the research and suggests future research 
areas for contributing to this exploratory work. 
 10 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A significant amount of literature exists on the topic of fusion centers.  A 
search of the term “fusion centers” in the Homeland Security Digital Library 
resulted in over 4000 related articles.  Issues within this topic have evolved since 
September 11, 2001, from the importance of filling intelligence gaps at the local, 
state, tribal, and federal level (International Association of Chiefs of Police 
[IACP], 2002; Flowers, 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States [9/11 Commission], 2004; Department of Justice [DOJ], 2006), to 
the need for establishing fusion centers (National Governors Association [NGA], 
2005; State and Local Fusion Centers, 2006), and to the current challenges 
faced by fusion centers (Department of Homeland Security Office of the 
Inspector General [DHS OIG], 2008; German & Stanley, 2007; Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2007; Magnuson, 2007; Nenneman, 2008; Focus on 
Fusion Centers, 2008; Rollins, 2008). However, fusion center literature is virtually 
silent on mayors and governors as consumers of fusion center services.   
Research focused on local and state chief executives yielded information 
reflecting interest in prevention of terrorism and emergencies.  The U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (USCM) and the National Governors Association (NGA) 
conducted a number of surveys giving insight to the executive perspective.  
USCM issued a report in 2002 titled, “Homeland Security: Mayors on the 
Frontline,” and the NGA produced an issue brief in 2007 titled, “2007 State 
Homeland Security Directors Survey.”  While neither the USCM nor NGA surveys 
addressed the end user satisfaction with fusion centers, both groups identified 
mayors and governors as having a lead role in prevention of and response to 
terrorism and emergencies.   
As noted in “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” 
characteristics of the 40-plus fusion centers examined at the time varied by each 
center; thus, no centers are exactly alike (Rollins, 2008).  Today, there are 72 
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fusion centers nationwide (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009).  The 
characteristics of each fusion center are based on the needs of each jurisdiction.  
A fusion center’s products and services may vary depending on the resources of 
the fusion center and needs of those who use the center’s products and services.  
Also, the concept of the fusion center was recently further defined by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security at the National Conference on Fusion Centers in 
March 2009, as a place where “prevention, planning, and consequence 
management” can be facilitated by the fusion center, if the right people are 
involved (Napolitano, 2009).  However, there is no specific mention of an 
interactive relationship between fusion centers and executives.  
As policy makers, research also shows that chief executives should have 
a central role in the fusion intelligence process (Gookins, 2008; Johnson & Wirtz, 
2008; Lowenthal, 2006; Teitelbaum, 2005). The President receives the 
Presidential Daily Briefing prepared by the Director of National Intelligence and 
the Economic Intelligence Brief prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(Hosenball, 2009).  At the local and state level, mayors and governors constantly 
gather information to aid their decision and policy-making process.  Fusion 
centers are uniquely positioned to assist mayors and governors.  According to 
the CRS report, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, one of the 
value propositions of fusion centers is that they fuse disparate streams of data 
from multi-source information or intelligence, produce analyses that generate 
knowledge, and are actionable for prevention, protection, and planning purposes 
(Rollins, 2008).   
With the free flow of information available from open sources, mayors and 
governors increasingly rely on open sources of information and data.  Open 
source is “general, widely available data and information; ‘gray’ literature; 
targeted commercial data; and individual experts” (Sims, 2005, p. 65).  Open 
source information can generate the information, which can be turned into 
intelligence and knowledge that executives lack and desire (Kipp, 2005).  
Because open source information can be overwhelming and unvetted, research 
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indicates that fusion centers, when staffed by capable analysts, are best 
positioned to leverage information, develop intelligence, and generate knowledge 
or actionable intelligence for policy makers (Isaacson & O’Connell, 2002).    
Research of mayors’ and governors’ spans of priority activities as reflected 
in news articles and the media reveals that their executive roles beyond decision 
and policy making include providing the public with visibility into risks through 
effective official communications and being visibly engaged during crisis 
management.  This was the case during September 11, 2001, when New York 
City Mayor Rudy Giuliani was visible throughout the crisis, providing information 
and updates to the public through the media (Purnick, 2001).   
When risk is communicated to the non-government community, trust 
towards government increases, and risks are shared between governments and 
the communities they serve (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009).  Such 
establishment of trust and understanding between the government, community, 
and the private sector helps to increase the efficiencies and collaboration in 
collective prevention and response to risks (Covey, 2006; Gerencser, Lee, 
Napolitano & Kelly, 2008; Magnuson, 2007).  The local and state response to the 
transatlantic plot involving airplanes in 2006 is an example of how mayors and 
governors, specifically, the Mayor of Los Angeles and the Governor of New York 
State, responded to a potential threat, (“Governor Pataki,” 2006; “L.A. Mayor 
Villaraigosa,” 2006).  In both cases, they assured the public that there was no 
specific threat to their city and state.  Each executive told of his communication 
with the Department of Homeland Security and British authorities to establish that 
there were no direct threats but that the Transportation Security Agency security 
level would be increased as a precaution.  Conversely, literature on lessons 
learned from the local, state, and federal responses to Hurricane Katrina point to 
failures of the President, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
Administrator, Louisiana Governor, and New Orleans Mayor in demonstrating 
leadership and maintaining a public presence (H.R. Rpt. No. 109–377, 2006; 
Sellnow et al., 2009; S. Rep. No. 109–322, 2006).   
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Nontraditional literature reviewed for fusion center information, executive 
perspectives, and budget and policy information included state and city websites 
such as Commonwealth of Virginia (www.virginia.gov), state of Maryland 
(www.maryland.gov), District of Columbia (www.dc.gov), Chicago City 
(www.cityofchicago.org), New York City (www.nyc.gov) and Los Angeles City 
(www.ci.la.ca.us). The majority of sites did not have fusion center information.   
Statutorily, strong mayors and governors frame the policy and budget 
strategy for their cities and states through their annual budget development 
process.  That process usually includes a rigorous examination of agency 
operations and performance from the prior year and is dependent on anticipated 
revenue.  The executive’s policy priorities are sometimes reshaped after the 
legislative body’s review and feedback.  Mayors and governors may be able to 
tap into fusion center capabilities to influence the policy discussions on critical 
infrastructure protection, emergency and health preparedness, prevention and 
response, public safety resources such as law enforcement, and fire and 
emergency medical services. 
Key to the fusion process is the exploitation of disparate information data 
streams through collaborative, multi-discipline analysis by analysts with diverse 
subject matter expertise to produce actionable intelligence tailored for the 
consumer.  This multi-agency perspective, multi-discipline expertise collaboration 
is critical to fusion center staffing and analytical product development 
(Napolitano, 2009).  Research shows that since Hurricane Katrina, federal, state, 
and local governments have continually stressed the importance of multiagency 
collaboration in emergency preparedness and response (Getha-Taylor, 2007; 
Larsen, 2007; National Association of State Chief Information Officers [NASCIO], 
2007).  As a collaborative environment, fusion centers also present opportunities 
where, with the right staffing, prevention, planning, and consequence 
management can be realized.  Examples of innovative collaborative 
environments exist in various successful companies (e.g., Google, Microsoft, 
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Bloomberg L.P.) and are emulated by the public sector, such as the city hall 
Bullpen workspaces for New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and 
Washington, DC Mayor Adrian Fenty (Nakamura, 2006).   
Literature on networks reveal that social networking developed through 
Web 2.0 is emerging as a new model for mayors, governors, and their 
constituents to foster better information exchange with each other (Epstein, 2009; 
Holbrook, 2007).  City and state websites, and other social network sites such as 
Twitter and Facebook, are extremely popular channels for political leaders to 
connect with their constituents, and provide another public visibility component 
used by executives.  Newark, New Jersey Mayor Cory Booker and San 
Francisco, California Mayor Gavin Newsom were both reportedly the two 
politicians with the highest number of Twitter followers compared to the 
combined total of every single U.S. mayor, 49 governors,2 and all members of 
Congress  (Epstein, 2009).  These forms of communication allow the 
personalities of the elected official to be witnessed firsthand by the public without 
official, formal filters.  This level of direct engagement through unspoiled short 
bursts of communication has helped to establish the authenticity that is difficult to 
identify through press statements and official speeches.   
Thus, the allure of connecting with the average constituent may also be 
used to share other types of information, such as advice on preventive measures 
against hazards, issuing crime alert notifications or warnings, and requests for 
community responses to natural disasters.  Likewise, information collected 
through social networks may enable fusion centers to develop better intelligence 
and provide informative and relevant recommendations to the policy and decision 
maker (Ressler, 2006; Stephenson & Bonabeau, 2007).   
The literature review has shown that while the topic of fusion centers is 
wide-ranging, it remains silent on mayors and governors as key customers.  
Chief executives have an abiding interest in the prevention of terrorism and 
                                            
2
 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California is ranked in the top 10 of highest number of 
followers for politicians on Twitter (Epstein, 2009). 
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emergencies and have the responsibility to respond to acts of terrorism and 
emergencies.  Research also shows that chief executives frame the policies and 
allocate resources for their jurisdiction.  Given that fusion centers are a 
prevention tool based on information and intelligence, it would suggest that 
fusion centers should be an ideal tool to help mayors and governors frame their 
policies related to public safety and allocating resources better.  This literature 
review has identified the need to extract executive perspectives and experiences 
and apply them as guidance and requirements to better enable fusion centers to 
be responsive to executive level needs.   
 
 17 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The qualitative research on executives’ decision-making processes, 
perspectives, engagement of, and satisfaction with their fusion centers, is 
summarized in Table 1.  The research methodology includes a review of 
scholarly literature and research, government reports and documents, 
professional and academic journals, and multimedia news articles.  It also 
includes a review of non-scholarly literature, such as information from cities and 
states websites, views of mayors and governors representing large urban areas, 
as well as research from websites for executive networks including the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors and the National Governors Association, and general 
interest books.  Because of the lack of information in available literature on 
executives’ engagement and degree of satisfaction with fusion centers, 
exploratory interviews (summarized in Chapter IV) were conducted in May 2009 
with senior staff, mayors, and governors of the Urban Areas Security Initiatives 
(UASI) Tier 1 jurisdictions.   
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Scholarly literature & 
research; academic 
text books 
    
Government reports 
and documents     
Professional and 
academic journals     
Multimedia news 
articles     
Government websites     
Executive network 
websites (USCM, NGA)     
General interest books     
Exploratory Interviews     
For interviews, the researcher considered reaching out to the 20 largest 
UASI sites instead of the seven Tier 1 areas.  However, given the high-profile 
nature of the cities in the Tier 1 areas, two of which were attacked on September 
11, 2001, the UASI Tier 1 sites were considered highly relevant because of their 
high-threat and high population density designation by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). An additional factor for ultimately selecting the 
members of the Tier 1 UASI group for a census of their experiences is that local 
and state chief executives established or agreed to fund these fusion centers 
serving their urban areas.  The National Fusion Center Coordination Group 
(NFCCG) issued a list of 70 fusion centers with 50 primary state designated 
fusion centers and 20 urban area fusion centers (2009).  All Tier 1 UASI areas 
had a fusion center on the NFCCG list.  The Tier 1 urban areas also receive the 
largest share of homeland security grant funding compared to the rest of the 
urban areas across the country (see Figure 1).  Therefore, it was assumed that  
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UASI Tier 1 executives would be attuned to using fusion center intelligence to 
support policies and decisions governing prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery.  
This research did not specifically identify the state or local fusion centers 
serving the Tier 1 UASIs nor does it focus on the products and services provided 
by specific fusion centers.  It also did not distinguish the difference between local, 
regional, and state fusion centers.  Rather, the focus of the research was on the 
chief executives’ satisfaction and perspectives as a key indicator for the value 
they place on these fusion centers.  The assumption was that the more satisfied 
and the more they sought engagement with their fusion centers the more value  
they placed on fusion centers.  The engagement by and satisfaction of chief 
executives with fusion centers are addressed and extrapolated in Chapters V, VI, 
and VII.  
The Tier 1 UASI areas identified for this research included the National 
Capital Region that encompasses the entire District of Columbia, localities in 
Northern Virginia, and Western Maryland.  Also identified were New York City, 
Jersey City, Newark, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Long Beach, and San 
Francisco.  As noted earlier, each of these urban areas had a local, regional, or 
state fusion center (National Fusion Center Coordination Group [NFCCG], 2009).  
Two governors’ offices were included in this initial census because of the 
executive offices’ involvement in their UASI.  The Commonwealth of Virginia and 
the state of Maryland were included in the census because of the executives’ 
involvement in the National Capital Region UASI.  
This research also draws on the author’s personal experience and 
observations working in the Office of the City Administrator, in the Executive 
office of the Mayor of Washington, DC.  The author’s involvement in the National 
Capital Region Homeland Security Senior Policy Group as a state representative 
for the District of Columbia provided a unique opportunity to engage senior 
representatives from the governor’s offices of Virginia and Maryland on their 
experiences with fusion centers.  Through other professional networks, this 
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author also engaged in several private conversations with experts and 
professionals that validated the information uncovered through the interviews. 
 
 
Figure 1.   FY2009 Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Awards (after U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. A–2)  
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Recognizing the nature of political offices, which tend to have busy 
schedules and are focused on their constituencies or addressing policy priorities, 
it was anticipated that political staff would not find this research topic and 
objective of performing an analyses of executive interviews a compelling reason 
for their executive to be personally involved.  Therefore, to give voice to the 
executive, a second group of people was identified: senior staff to mayors and 
governors with which these chief executives regularly interact and engage, and 
senior staff members have the best insight to the executive decision-making 
process.   
To establish communications, this researcher identified individuals 
cultivated through professional networks, through senior level staff from 
executive offices, and through current and previous colleagues working in the 
jurisdictions targeted for research. Once introductions or referrals were 
established, this author spoke to each key contact requesting that his or her 
mayor or governor participate in the interview.  While some contacts were helpful 
in facilitating the interview request, the author received no responses directly 
from any mayor or governor. For those chief executives with whom the 
researcher could not establish communications, an email with the interview 
questions was sent to mayors and governors to ensure due diligence in 
demonstrating that the opportunity to respond was provided to mayors and 
governors.  Interview questions were developed in advance, and approved by the 
Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board.   
In explaining the lack of responses from chief executives, some staff to a 
number of chief executives chose not to ask their executives to participate in 
interviews but offered to provide responses themselves. Thus, the second group, 
i.e., previously identified senior staff was interviewed with the same questions.   
Pre-developed questions ranged from the baseline assessment of 




fortailored briefings, feedback on services and products, to whether fusion 
centers contributed to executive decision making, and how fusion centers could 
be more valuable in the future (see Appendix A). 
To elicit candid responses, exploratory interviews were requested with the 
guarantee that responses would not be attributable and that interview subjects 
would remain anonymous.  While some expressed concerns with participating, 
senior level government representatives from six out of the 11 identified cities 
and states responded.  Only one respondent provided responses through email.  
Some respondents did not feel comfortable giving feedback using email due to 
concerns that government email records might be obtained through Freedom of 
Information Act or other means.  Other respondents did not feel they could 
adequately provide their responses via email.  Some respondents initiated phone 
calls to this researcher and bypassed the email response process.  One 
respondent met with the researcher and spoke at length.  In another forum, two 
respondents met with the researcher in person to share recent reactions to a 
professional network gathering on information sharing between the local, state, 
and federal governments.  At all times, respondents were made aware that this 
researcher took notes throughout, and they were told that their identities would 
not be revealed, nor their remarks attributed to their organization.   
Exploratory interviews conducted in person or over the phone ranged 
between 45 minutes to 90 minutes.  The feedback reflected an array of 
substantive responses, from additional discussion topics beyond the scope of 
this research topic to responses that were limited due to lack of personal insight 
to the executive’s perspective.  Phone calls, additional emails, and face-to-face 
meetings helped clarify responses.   
B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The analytical framework for identifying the end user’s satisfaction with 
fusion centers in this research is limited in several ways. The lack of 
representative data in executive-provided responses from the UASI Tier 1 urban 
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areas remains an obstacle to refining the impact and value of fusion centers to 
this key customer group.  The lack of executive-provided responses prevents an 
understanding of their true needs and for identifying ways to meet those needs.  
The lack of willingness of the majority of designated individuals representing 
chief executives to provide written responses reveals uneasiness with public 
exposure of their role and with their characterization of the utility of fusion centers 
on behalf of their chief executives.  However, the willingness of three of the six 
respondents representing major metropolitan areas to speak at length, including 
one who responded to nearly all interview questions through emails, yielded 
valuable insight to their chief executives’ mindsets, interactions, and satisfaction 
levels.   
Of the six interviews, two respondents did not provide full responses.  One 
of those two respondents indicated that the fusion center was not on the 
executive’s radar; therefore, there had been no engagement with it or 
expectations of it.  The other respondent expressed great satisfaction with their 
jurisdiction’s law enforcement agency and indignation over the need for direct 
executive engagement with the fusion center when the executive regularly 
communicated with the chief of their law enforcement agency.  The focus of 
Chapter IV will be to summarize the responses of the substantive interviews and 
the less detailed responses, and draw general inferences that are explored in the 
following chapters. 
C. GENERALIZABILITY 
Since interviews were the primary research source for answering what 
mayors and governors of UASI Tier 1 jurisdictions were gaining and seeking from 
their fusion centers, and to identify what would help them effectively use their 
fusion centers, the author formed general ideas based on the data collected from 
interviews with executive staff.  The findings from the six respondents, therefore, 
represent a census of the Tier 1 UASI areas.  Generalizability is reasoning 
predicated on a frequent occurrence that predicts similar occurrences in the 
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future (Barnes et al., 2005).  However, the exploratory interviews performed were 
not sufficient in number nor did the content reflect the recurring themes to permit 
high confidence generalization beyond the Tier 1 UASI. 
 
 25 
IV. SUMMARY RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS 
Exploratory interviews with senior staff who understand what the executive 
needs for governing provided insight to the experiences and viewpoints of chief 
executives on fusion centers.  Interviews with six jurisdictions were conducted 
out of the 11 jurisdictions that were identified and contacted.  The following 
themes best summarize the interview/census response: (a) baseline assessment 
of executive engagement; (b) frequency level of briefings and requests; (c) 
feedback on services and products; (d) impact to executive decision making.  An 
additional section (e) on improving fusion center value for the executive provides 
an analysis of the interview results.  All interviews and discussions were 
conducted on the basis that no information would be directly attributable to any 
jurisdictions.  Interview questions are included in Appendix A. 
A. BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
Interview responses reflect that while the idea of a fusion center holds 
great promise for prevention and forecasting of threats based on multi-source 
information and pattern analysis, the majority of mayors and governors do not 
regularly engage with their fusion centers directly as the primary source of threat 
information and actionable intelligence.   
Interview responses revealed that the majority of chief executives have 
never received direct briefings by fusion center personnel.  The majority of chief 
executives receive information directly through their homeland security advisor, 
chief of the law enforcement agency, or equivalent public safety senior 
personnel.  Respondents indicated that the fusion center is a law enforcement 
agency component and the director of the law enforcement agency receives 
regular fusion center briefings.  Therefore, based on the significance of a threat, 
the executive would be briefed when necessary and as determined by the law 
enforcement agency chief, public safety director, homeland security advisor, or 
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the executive’s senior staff. Another reason cited for lack of direct executive-
fusion center engagement was that the executive was too busy and relied on 
senior staff to determine the need for briefings.   
The majority of respondents shared that the level of threat intelligence 
received in briefings was not relevant, specific, useful, or meaningful enough, in 
the context of the executive’s governance purview or responsibility, to warrant 
any direct engagement of the executive. One respondent had trouble 
understanding why the executive would need to have direct engagement with the 
fusion center when it was a function of the law enforcement agency.  Another 
respondent simply said he did not think the fusion center was on the executive’s 
radar, that he did not believe there was any direct contact, and doubts that the 
executive has any particular expectations for the fusion center. 
Senior staff that provided responses viewed their role in receiving threat 
briefings as the executive substitute, and they expected detailed and relevant 
information pertaining to their jurisdictions. The majority of respondents noted 
that they believe their fusion center’s intelligence analysis should yield specific 
information that could help them recommend to the executive the adjustment of 
resources or development of policies to support homeland security and public 
safety.  A minority of respondents expressed satisfaction with the intelligence 
information developed by their fusion center.   
B. FREQUENCY AND TYPES OF BRIEFINGS AND REQUESTS 
The majority of respondents received some form of daily briefing, regular 
alerts or summaries of information such as raw suspicious activity reporting, 
terrorist screening list hits, fire investigations, specific and aggregate crime 
information, health and safety warnings, law enforcement safety threat 
summaries and recommended actions, and news on international and domestic 
terror threats or attacks.  Interviews revealed that senior staff, while appreciative 
of fusion centers’ efforts in providing regular briefings or notifications, found that 
they needed to request specific information in order to receive tailored briefings.   
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Respondents expressed the expectation that fusion centers should know or 
anticipate the executive’s needs and frequency for particular briefings and levels 
of details.   
Two respondents were positive about the level of proactive briefings they 
received without their prompting.  One of the two respondents noted that while 
proactive briefings met their executive expectation, the executive office still had 
to specifically request H1N1 information and workplace violence information, 
despite rising H1N1 pandemic concerns and, in this particular jurisdiction, a 
recent violent incident in a workplace.  Another respondent noted the need to 
request, on numerous occasions, threat assessments for anticipated events.  
The same respondent had previous experience with the service or product not 
being delivered without prompting and a deadline.   
The level of effort involved in requesting briefings ranged from minimal to 
high.  Few respondents made direct requests to fusion centers due to lack of 
open channels between the executive and their fusion center, while one 
respondent noted that requests for weekly briefings was not welcomed by the law 
enforcement entity overseeing the fusion center due to lack of staff resources 
and lack of threat information.  The same respondent also indicated that requests 
for products and briefings often took weeks because of the internal law 
enforcement agency legal review and approval process and scheduling 
availability of the agency briefer.  Another respondent said that his executive 
received daily briefings and was in regular phone contact from the head of their 
law enforcement entity so there was no need to request for briefings. 
C. FEEDBACK ON SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 
The majority of respondents expressed an underwhelming level of 
insightful information from their fusion centers regarding details, jurisdictional 
relevancy, and pattern analyses.  Chief executives, according to the majority of 
senior staff responses, want to be made aware of their jurisdiction’s threat 
environment and daily operational environment. However, all but one respondent 
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said they are not receiving information from fusion centers that meets those 
expectations.  While respondents said they received daily briefings, they also 
noted that fusion center-developed intelligence was not specifically relevant to 
the mayor’s or governor’s needs.   
The majority of respondents were concerned with the quality of 
information generated and the apparent lack of intelligence developed from multi-
source information.  One respondent suggested that language used in reporting 
raw suspicious activity reports, which sometimes are passed on from federal or 
other sources, seemed unsophisticated and did not focus on the actual 
suspicious activity.    
Several respondents commented that there did not seem to be fusion 
occurring, meaning that fusion center products appeared only to have a law 
enforcement perspective even if the content of the product was predominantly 
about a health or fire issue.  One respondent further indicated extreme general 
dissatisfaction saying that his fusion center’s daily summaries were not tailored 
for the executive or non-law enforcement audiences and felt the product was 
developed as a general set of information for all recipients.  The primary concern 
was that non-law enforcement personnel would not understand the information 
reported.  This respondent felt that this level of effort did not warrant the fusion 
center’s standing as a critical node for intelligence. 
The majority of respondents said that they received a plethora of 
redundant information from multiple sources and networks outside of their fusion 
center, including online news media.  One respondent said the information from 
the fusion center was transactional rather than value-added, meaning that the 
fusion center appeared to pass on exactly the same information received through 
other networks with no further local or regional insight to add jurisdictional 
relevancy.  The majority of respondents expressed an interest that fusion centers 
be the central body in their jurisdiction or region to receive or extract reporting 
from all levels of intelligence communities and from other multiple sources of 
data and information and then to provide a synthesis of products that have 
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unique or newly distilled intelligence insights.  They felt that the executive’s office 
was saturated with generalized, irrelevant, non-insightful, non-actionable 
products and briefings for the executive. 
The majority of respondents shared that the lack of insights to the terrorist 
tactics and strategies used in overseas and domestic attacks and lack of 
recommendations based on lessons learned for preparing and responding to 
natural disaster events was a disservice to the executive.  Two respondents said 
the lack of fusion center coverage of the day-to-day issues such as crime 
patterns and local threats or risks were missed opportunities to making fusion 
center products relevant and timely.  Another respondent wondered how their 
fusion center contributed to or benefited from the larger network of fusion centers 
if fusion centers did not provide local and regional insight.    
Several respondents noted the lack of willingness by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) to share information through their local and state fusion 
centers, and how they believe it impeded their fusion center’s efforts to produce 
useful products. They were under the impression that FBI field offices 
independently decide when to share information and with whom at the local and 
state levels.  Respondents acknowledged the support from the Department of 
Homeland Security with DHS assigned analysts; however, the lack of FBI sharing 
or partnerships with their fusion centers led them to believe information sharing 
by the FBI was still a challenge.   
This information was further validated during private discussions with the 
author in July and August of 2009 with experts who confirmed that FBI field 
offices primarily determined information sharing policies with local and state 
partners and chief executives.  A key example is in the current design of the 
system-based information sharing concepts at the local and state level that 
forces contribution to the FBI system, rather than enabling information 




want to see FBI information, they must use the FBI’s Guardian or LEO programs 
rather than using information from a multi-source system integrated with local law 
enforcement’s information system architecture. 
Responses were mixed about the process for giving feedback to fusion 
centers.  One respondent who expressed satisfaction with the services and 
products said no feedback was ever necessary because it met their expectation; 
however, it was this respondent that also indicated that he needed to request for 
additional information on other topics, suggesting that, at least in this case, there 
were still some executive needs not being fulfilled.  A number of respondents 
who expressed dissatisfaction with the information received did not go into 
details about providing feedback.  One respondent suggested that the number of 
questions asked during the briefing or in response to a product should be 
indicative of their feedback on the service and product.   
All respondents except for two were emphatic of their desire to receive 
classified information.  These respondents said that it mattered to them that 
briefings included classified information because they believed classified 
information meant a higher level of detail.  A respondent said, “how do I know 
what I don’t know?”  However, responses revealed that even when they received 
such information, they have been unimpressed with the level of detail considered 
classified.  The majority of respondents suggested that the lack of useful 
information in classified material was the result of the lack of collaboration or 
information sharing from the federal intelligence community with their fusion 
centers.  The majority of respondents also noted anecdotally that the Top Secret 
classification of information made it impossible for those that have Secret level 
clearance to receive the intelligence.  The majority of respondents also indicated 
concern with the federal control of access to intelligence which suggested the 
federal effort did not support the National Strategy for Information Sharing.   
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D. IMPACT ON EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING 
Interviews show that there is a lack of relevancy to the executive’s 
perspective and threshold of interest in the information provided through fusion 
center services and products.  In general, respondents felt that fusion center’s 
perspectives and appreciation for the executive-level operating environment were 
very limited.  The evident lack of fusion center insight and foresight concerning 
the executive’s operating environment makes it impossible to provide information 
relevant to the decision-making needs of the executive.  
The majority of respondents noted that intelligence analysis should yield 
specific information that could help them make recommendations to the 
executive (e.g., adjustment of resources for agencies; identify and change 
existing policies; mitigate vulnerability in identified area).  One respondent felt 
that the fusion center should provide a long-term threat assessment so that the 
annual strategic planning and budgeting process could be better informed 
resulting in resources appropriately distributed.  However, the same respondent 
noted that gaps existed between threat assessments and resource expenditures.  
The example given was the need for threat assessments to determine the level 
of budgeting required for personnel deployment for a planned event.  The 
respondent said that threat assessments indicated no increased risk or concerns.  
Yet, several months after the planned event, the personnel costs associated with 
security deployment for the event were significantly higher than in the past and 
had no correlation to the earlier threat assessment.  This type of threat 
assessment is irrelevant to the executive and may erode credibility of information 
developed in the future and the fusion center.   
Several respondents mentioned the previous overseas attacks on civilian 
locations (e.g., Mumbai; Islamabad) and said the briefings and information 
received from the fusion center were already available through open sources.  
They wanted to know about the terrorist tactics and strategies employed to 
understand how their local security posture could be improved throughout the  
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jurisdiction.  One respondent said after an initial briefing on the Mumbai attacks, 
the executive asked for further briefings because the Mumbai incident had strong 
resonance to their metropolitan area.   
According to several private conversations with colleagues, immediately 
following an attack (domestic and foreign), most sources (other than the news) 
reduce the level of information sharing because of ongoing investigations and 
lack of corroboration.  This makes it problematic for fusion centers to meet the 
needs and demands of local and state chief executives who require immediate 
development of information to understand the security risks to their region.  
Additional information revealed that FBI field offices’ approach to information 
sharing with local and state law entities are dependent on the personality of the 
field office leadership and the culture of the FBI personnel.  Generally, it is 
difficult to obtain information from FBI personnel because they do not want to 
share it with non-law enforcement individuals. 
Another respondent suggested that their executive could be integral to 
communicating key risk and crisis information to the public and wanted their 
fusion center to generate information for the public, private sector and 
government employees so that they could be made aware of hazards and be 
prepared to respond or take precautions. If the public knew what was being done 
with the information collected, this form of transparency could help decrease civil 
liberties concerns that the government had nefarious intentions.  
E. IMPROVING FUSION CENTER VALUE 
The majority of respondents articulated the need for fusion centers to 
improve the products and to improve the fusion center’s value to chief 
executives.  Measures include improving content through jurisdictional relevancy, 
analytical insights, cultural and multi-disciplinary context, identifying a trusted 
briefer to the executive, helping the executive maintain a knowledge and decision 
advantage, providing him or her with distilled intelligence relevant to decision 
making, and developing risk information and crisis management.   
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Fusion centers should distinguish themselves from the 24-hour public 
media.  Fusion center products and services value can be significantly improved 
if senior personnel and fusion center analysts are educated on the intelligence 
cycle.  The quality of intelligence developed by fusion centers would be improved 
through the education of chief executives and senior personnel concerning the 
intelligence development process, including an executive requirements session 
and getting executive involvement throughout the intelligence process.   
Executives are not educated in the intelligence cycle.  Either they do not 
know what to expect from intelligence, or their expectations are too high.  
Meanwhile, it is difficult to address what their intelligence support requirements 
are.  Because of this lack of education, fusion center personnel should work with 
trusted senior personnel (executive staffs, senior advisors, heads of law 
enforcement, homeland security advisors, emergency management directors, 
chiefs of staff, public safety directors, etc.) who, by default, hold the responsibility 
of engaging their fusion centers.  Ultimately, these individuals can identify the 
potential policy and support needs of their chief executive to help guide fusion 
centers. 
The senior level staffs also play a critical role in determining when to brief 
their mayor or governor.  These trusted senior level personnel either serve as the 
firewall that prevents direct engagement of the executive or serve as the conduits 
of engagement for fusion centers. The coaching process involved in guiding the 
fusion center in the production of tailored briefings will help build trust between 
the briefer and the consumer.  When a comfort level is achieved, the trusted 
senior personnel can become the conduit for setting up opportunities with the 
executive for fusion center briefings.  The more fusion center analysts learn 
about executive style, preference, and interests through senior personnel, the 
more they can be prepared to provide the right level of intelligence briefing or 
product meeting the executive’s needs. 
Fusion centers and federal partners should also address classification 
issues, specifically the accessibility of classified information and the ability to 
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share it with local and state chief executives when appropriate.  It is clear through 
the interview responses that local and state executives believe their knowledge 
advantage suffers when federal partners withhold information.  Recognizing that 
classified information shared by federal agencies can only be sanitized or 
downgraded by the federal agency providing the original product, local and state 
officials are reliant on the “owner” of the information to declassify and share with 
them.  Private conversations with experts reveal that tear-lines3 are rarely 
included in classified documents produced by federal partners for are not 
developed in a manner timely enough to share with local and state partners.  
Opportunities to know about valuable tactical and strategic information may be 
missed by local law enforcement and public safety partners (Homeland Security 
Information Network, 2007).  Thus, it is imperative that federal partners declassify 
or provide tear-lines in the classified materials so that they can share with local 
and state partners.   
Writing for release4 or development of an executive level sensitive product 
for chief executives with no Secret level security clearance should be prudent 
under current classification policies. For Top Secret classified information, federal 
partners in fusion centers should be able to provide fusion analysts with pertinent 
releasable information while preserving Top Secret level classification with 
appropriate handling instructions.  This “write for release” is an approach that 
fusion analysts should adopt when they develop their intelligence analysis for 
executives. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This interview summary provides insight that was previously silent on 
executive perspective and engagement of their fusion centers.  From the group 
                                            
3
 Tear-lines provide delineation on classified documents of sensitive source content and/or 
intelligence sources and methods. They allow receipt of modified products when the sensitive 
source above the tear-line is retained by the producer (McConnell, 2007).  
4
 Writing for release is the practice of drafting a document based on classified sources in 
such a way as to facilitate a favorable decision on its release at lowered classification level, or at 
the unclassified level to support intelligence sharing.  
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of senior level respondents, this researcher uncovered that the majority of chief 
executives are not regularly engaging with and are not finding satisfaction with 
their fusion centers.  While the ideal of a fusion center remains high, the real 
value of their fusion center seems low.  One of the reasons respondents believe 
contributes to the lack of engagement is the fusion center’s lack of awareness of 
the role of chief executives, especially the high-profile nature of their roles in 
responding to crises and emergencies.  Ultimately, mayors and governors are 
accountable for local preparedness, response, and mitigation of events 
regardless of the nature of threats and events.  The next section addresses the 
role of mayors and governors as leaders of their jurisdictions, their need for 
situational awareness, knowledge and decision advantages, the importance of 
conveying risk and crisis communications to the public, and the significant role 
that trusts plays in the information chief executives receive. 
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V. EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY 
In the complex world of homeland security, where the confluence of 
security and emerging threats often intersect and collide with politics and limited 
resources, leaders often find themselves engulfed in a maelstrom of activities 
that require their ability to understand the context in which they find themselves 
and to adjust their actions accordingly.  Under the shadow of global and domestic 
threats and faced with local challenges and uncertainties, mayors and governors 
are frontline homeland security defenders who need a full suite of tools and 
information to help them understand the complex operating environment within 
their jurisdictions.   
Feedback from the exploratory interviews yielded useful insights such as a 
general sense that fusion centers did not understand the information needs of 
mayors and governors as decision makers. Consequently, fusion center products 
lack relevancy and utility to the day-to-day executive operating environment.   
This chapter on executive accountability provides insights to the role and 
needs of chief executives, their methods and measures for developing daily 
situational awareness and sense making, the public scrutiny and challenges they 
face during crises and emergencies as the highest profile elected official, and the 
significance of trust in developing credibility with stakeholders. 
A. ROLE OF MAYORS AND GOVERNORS 
As key leaders and as the top elected official of their jurisdictions, mayors 
and governors are under constant pressure to deliver efficient and effective 
government services and actions. From ensuring that potholes are filled, 
swimming pools are safe and accessible, and 911 calls are answered, to 
providing quality healthcare, public school education, and public safety, chief 
executives bear the primary responsibility for managing limited resources, 
shaping public policies, and addressing constituent concerns on a daily basis.   
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Chief executives are responsible to taxpayers for equitable distribution of 
tax revenue and ensuring that basic government services are delivered in the 
most efficient, effective, and timely manner.  Executives are also under constant 
public scrutiny and pressure, which is evident in each election cycle, and in the 
local daily news media that are constantly alert to opportunities to expose waste, 
fraud, and abuses of the government.  Performance indicators such as crime 
statistics, educational test scores, neighborhood blight, traffic management, 
customer services, fire and EMS responses, and 911 call-dispatches are also 
measures of executive performance.  Gathering these indicators and making 
them public is a form of transparency and accountability that many local and 
state governments provide to the public. 
As the key decision maker for their jurisdictions, mayors and governors 
rely on sense making based on the best set of information available to them.  
Aside from performance indicators noted in the previous paragraph, chief 
executives have situational awareness methods that help them identify the weak 
areas that need attention or the bureaucratic chokepoints for correction.  Some 
methods employed by executives to maintain situational awareness include 
regular meetings with trusted staff to review issues, services or operations.   
As noted in Chapter I, chief executives leverage information through their 
staff on a daily basis, drawing from the staff’s analysis of policies, operations, 
budgets, the political landscape, the media, and community issues.  Executives 
use that knowledge to assess perceptions of government performance, while 
providing their staff with feedback on what more they want to know about or 
understand.  With keen political perspective, mayors and governors are astute at 
identifying the context of situations and adjusting their behavior, decisions, and 
actions to address or adapt to the circumstances with which they are presented.  
For chief executives, this includes understanding the issues at stake, working 
collaboratively with stakeholders and key players, and deciding when to get 
involved.   
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B. NEED FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, KNOWLEDGE, AND 
DECISION ADVANTAGES 
Interviews revealed that mayors and governors expect their staffs to know 
everything that is occurring in their jurisdictions and hold staffs responsible for 
informing them on issues when needed. Chief executives, depending on 
personal interests and style, employ various methods, tools, and staff to keep 
abreast of as many issues as possible.  In the absence of certainty and often 
constrained by time, the executive relies on the ability to know as much detail as 
quickly as possible when events dictate.  The mechanisms for staying informed 
include: daily information and updates by senior staff on legislative issues, 
economic development, educational issues, agency operations, policy priorities, 
community issues, crime data, public health indicators, regional and national 
issues, reliance on tools such as electronic alerts and notifications, analysis of 
emerging trends, patterns, or anomalies in government performance, and 
customer service demands.  This is not an exhaustive list. 
According to interviews with senior staff, the issue areas and level of 
details required by the executive depends on the priorities and interests of the 
executive, as well as the emergency or crisis of the day.  The executive’s 
prioritizing process, therefore, is dynamic and dependent on real-time 
information.  This demand for situational awareness helps the executive 
understand the context in which he or she must operate or lead and provides the 
executive opportunities to adapt when necessary.  In the absence of such 
information and confronted with knowledge shortfalls and uncertainties, the 
executive does not want to be forced into making decisions. Situational 
awareness and sense making are important to an executive’s effective 
management of risks, crises, and public trust, especially in high threat and high 
population density urban areas.  These regions experience a variety of man-
caused and natural hazards, while remaining top terrorist targets.  Interview 
participants spoke of the need for each of their chief executive to have 
awareness of terrorism threats relevant to their jurisdictions.  The examples of 
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Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and former New York State Governor 
George Pataki, in their measured public response to the transatlantic plot in 2006 
involving airplanes, represented the importance of situational awareness and 
sense making to them as chief executives managing risks and the public trust.   
However, no respondents who had positive interactions with their fusion 
center services and products were explicit in how the information contributed to 
shaping policies, planning, and budgeting.  Without examples, this may suggest 
that fusion center products and services have minimal to no impact.  For those 
that had less positive interactions, one respondent addressed the need to have 
lessons learned from real incidents and actionable information for the executive. 
In interviews senior staff pointed to the importance of their executive being 
informed in advance of negative developments by federal authorities as a 
courtesy and respect for the mayor or governor’s position as the jurisdiction’s 
chief executive.  Detailed information helps the executive and his agencies to 
identify the resources to support the preparedness and response efforts and to 
keep their constituencies informed, prepared, and, ultimately, safe.  In the 
months after the 9/11 attacks, the lack of coordinated information sharing by 
federal authorities with localities and states caused many mayors and governors 
to respond unevenly, ultimately contributing to uncoordinated and costly security 
defense actions (Belluck & Egan, 2001).  
C. IMPORTANCE OF RISK COMMUNICATION 
According to Sellnow et al. (2009), the “ultimate goal of effective risk 
communication is to avoid crises” (p. 4).  One of the lessons learned as a result 
of Hurricane Katrina is the importance of timely risk communications to the 
public.  In the Failure of Initiative report by the U.S. House Select Bipartisan 
Committee, the risk of Hurricane Katrina hitting New Orleans was forecasted and 
well anticipated, as was the potential breaching of the levee (H.R. Rpt. No. 109–
377, 2006). Yet, local, state, and federal officials failed to coordinate their 
planning and preparations for the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, and they failed 
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to effectively communicate the following to the public: the risks involved in 
sheltering in place during a Category 5 hurricane, the potential breach of the 
levee, and the effect of the aftermath of this once in a lifetime event (S. Rep. No. 
109–322, 2006).  The crises post-Katrina was further exacerbated by the lack of 
leadership and multi-agency collaboration in managing critically needed 
resources for the affected communities.   
Public dissatisfaction in government officials was especially high after the 
hurricane (Pew, 2005).  It is an understatement to say that mayors and governors 
do not want to repeat the failures associated with Hurricane Katrina.  It is also a 
mistake to believe that mayors and governors alone could have prevented the 
failures of Hurricane Katrina.  Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly suggest in 
Megacommunities that in an interdependent world, the megacommunity 
consisting of governments, businesses, and communities must work together to 
manage complexities and challenges (2008).  In order to collectively prepare and 
respond, information about risks and consequences needs to be shared so that 
actions can be developed. 
According to Sellnow et al., effective risk communication facilitates risk 
sharing between officials and with the community and offers a collaborative 
approach to addressing shared risks (2009).  Fusion centers in high threat, high 
population density urban areas should be used to help mayors and governors 
understand their jurisdictional and operating risks for significant events and 
threats.  Fusion centers in major urban areas are uniquely positioned to draw 
upon federal, state, local, and private sector participants for collaboration in 
developing risk assessments, situational awareness, and intelligence based on 
analysis of information from all sources.  A central premise in performing multi-
agency risk assessments should be that the findings would ultimately be shared 
with the public.    
Executives appreciate the opportunity to frame issues before the media 
takes control.  There is also the challenge of knowing what risk information to 
share while avoiding mass panic or when information is not useful, resulting in a 
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lack of public response.  One interview respondent felt that fusion centers, in 
identifying patterns leading to a potential threat, would be able to provide the 
executive with risk information that can be shared with the public before an 
incident, if possible, rather than solely focus on the crisis messaging after an 
incident.  Wray, Rivers, Whitworth, Jupka, and Clements found that successful 
government risk communications depend on the public’s confidence in the 
government (2006).  A way to building the public trust in government should be to 
build a mutual dialogue and a risk-sharing, decision-making process with the 
public.  Sellnow et al. argue the need for the government to maintain honest and 
open communication with the public before, during, and after the crisis (2009).  
This gives credibility and legitimacy during a time of uncertainty and allows the 
executive to establish a higher level of trust with the public. 
Alleviation of fear, anxiety, and confusion among the public are also 
significant factors motivating mayors and governors to embrace an effective risk 
communication strategy. Research by the National Academy of Sciences 
suggests developing risk communication before an event as a way to minimize 
the psychological consequences of terrorism and other traumatic events (2003).  
It is also a way to build a resilient culture that can withstand the long-term effects.  
Much like the childhood lessons of “stop, drop, and roll” when on fire, appropriate 
risk messaging mentally equips and trains the individual to be able to prevent or 
proactively respond in ways that gives the individual control of his or her 
situation.  Instead of informing the public that they are on their own for the first 72 
hours of a natural disaster or large scale incident, perhaps government policies 
and preparedness actions should emphasize the empowerment of individuals 
and communities by involving them in the development of local preparations, 
solutions, and decisions (Bach & Kaufmann, 2009). 
Psychology research has shown that when people are self sufficient, 
believe they can control their situations, and adapt to changes, they are more 
resilient (Bongar et al., 2007).  Additionally, government leaders need to be 
culturally sensitive to special needs communities (e.g., seniors, indigent, minority, 
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and immigrant communities) and to craft risk communication messages through 
conduits that are best received by such communities (e.g., nursing homes, 
shelters, health care aides, religious, cultural, and ethnic representatives, and the 
media).  Traditionally, emergency management agencies are responsible for risk 
identification and contingency planning.  In major urban cities, emergency 
management agencies should consider closely integrating with fusion centers so 
that they could play a significant role in developing and coordinating information 
to assist these communities. 
D. IMPORTANCE OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION  
Interviews revealed that improved fusion center value would be achieved 
by providing chief executives with information to communicate to the public that 
would reduce concerns generated by uncertainty.  The goals of terrorism include 
provoking widespread fear, insecurity, and changed behaviors of government, 
the public and private sectors.  Without adequate crisis communication, the goals 
of terrorism may be easily achieved (Breckinridge & Zimbardo, 2007). 
Oftentimes, the public remembers the visible presence of mayors and 
governors during crises.  One of the lessons learned from the September 11 
attacks was the importance of public visibility and messaging conveyed by then 
New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani.  While he may not have had the opportunity 
to communicate risk information of the terrorists attacks because no local and 
state executive was privy to that information, held by the federal intelligence 
community, Giuliani’s ubiquitous presence after the attacks reassured a nervous 
public that he was in charge of the city (Purnick, 2001). This type of phenomenon 
is noted by sociologist Max Weber that people who follow leaders during crises 
demonstrate “a devotion born of distress and enthusiasm” (1968, p. 23).  Former 
Los Angeles City Mayor Richard Riordan also explained the role of mayors 
during crises as "99% showmanship" because people want to see their leaders 
(Zahniser & Willon, 2008).  With similar sentiment, Washington, DC Mayor Adrian 
Fenty declared the importance of being “omnipresent and visible” in the 
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community (Ifill, 2009, p. 229). The high visibility of these mayors may help to 
reduce concerns during uncertainties, but it is their efforts to communicate clearly 
early on and to mobilize people, communities, and organizations for positive 
collaborative actions that mitigates fear during crises and helps build community 
resiliency.    
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger noted the importance of crisis communication 
to crisis management (2006).  This includes communication within organizations, 
externally with other organizations, and with the public.  After a crisis or terrorist 
attack, communication with the public can reduce negative post-traumatic stress 
(Breckinridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Burke & Cooper, 2008).  Mayors and governors 
who appear on site after a crisis seek to reassure the public that there will be 
resolution.  The corporate world has shown that executive level involvement in 
crisis communications is a familiar characteristic (O’Donnell, 2009). For example, 
the CEO of Odwalla food company was directly involved in the public messaging 
and product recall of tainted apple juice in 1996, and the CEO of Jet Blue airlines 
publicly apologized for stranding passengers on several planes waiting on the 
tarmac for 9 hours and issued a passenger’s bill of rights in 2007 (“Jet Blue 
Cancels Flights,” 2007). 
Crisis communications within organizations and outside of organizations 
have also been explored.  Walter, Hall, and Hobfoll suggest that there are 
psychological effects to organizational behavior during and after a crisis (2008).  
They maintain that after a mass casualty event or terrorist attack, organizations 
can play a significant role for the community and employees.  This includes 
having emergency response and continuity of operations plans in place so that 
staff know what to do during uncertainties, that their families are safe, and so that 
individuals can empower themselves.  The authors assert that organizations that 
are adaptive to such incidents can help reduce negative post-traumatic stress 
and can provide the public the sense of security, certainty, and normalcy after 
suffering trauma and disruption to their routines (Walter, Hall, & Hobfall, 2008).   
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF TRUST  
Public trust is also important for mayors and governors.  When they 
communicate risk information, chief executives want the public to heed their 
advice and or follow instructions.  According to the International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters, qualitative research findings in “Public Perceptions 
about Trust in Emergency Risk Communication” reflect that the public wants 
information from government officials that is candid, accurate, and useful (Wray, 
Rivers, Whitworth, Jupka, & Clements, 2006).  According to a recent national 
survey on disaster experiences and preparedness cited in the Homeland Security 
Affairs Journal, a large majority of Americans are paying attention to terrorist 
threats but do not trust what the government tells them (Bach & Kaufmann, 
2009).  One way to address this trust gap is to engage the community similar to 
how public health experts do when they educate the public to identify signs and 
symptoms so that the public is collectively involved in the response and feels 
empowered (Bach & Kaufmann, 2009).  
Collaborative trust with other partners (e.g., federal, state, regional, private 
industry, non-government organizations) is also significant.  In the days after the 
September 11 attacks, mayors and governors were either not informed, or not 
given actionable intelligence by the federal government, on potential terrorists 
threats (Belluck & Egan, 2001).  According to interviews with senior staff, sharing 
of information by the federal law enforcement and intelligence communities with 
localities and states has improved since 9/11, but significant efforts need to be 
made to improve timeliness and to make sharing less restrictive.  A private 
discussion with a senior official highlighted that a form of information trading 
occurs among local, state, and federal authorities out of necessity rather than 
information sharing based on trust or responsibility to share.   
Relationship trust is a critical element for chief executives and their senior 
staff.  The exploratory research revealed that chief executives relied on their 
senior personnel to determine when briefings and intelligence are needed.  Such 
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designated or self-identified intermediaries address the engagement gap 
between chief executives and fusion centers; however, interviews reveal that 
chief executives are still not receiving adequate information for knowledge and 
decision advantages.  Fusion centers suffer without executive direction and 
oversight of their activities. 
Trust in information presented is essential to providing the executive with 
a knowledge and decision advantage.  The executive must be able to rely on 
information that is credible and legitimately developed or risk losing the public 
trust in the institution, and how information is obtained and shared.  The most 
recent example of a loss in credibility by a fusion center is the exposure of the 
Texas Fusion Center’s issuance of a “Prevention Awareness Bulletin,” stating the 
importance of law enforcement officials to report “activities of lobbying groups, 
Muslim civil rights organizations and anti-war protest groups in their areas” 
(“Fusion Center Encourages Improper,” 2009).  This reporting without a criminal 
predicate demonstrates a lack of sensitivity towards free speech activities and is 
an affront to the basic rights of Americans.  Covey suggested that the lack of 
trust could be costly, inefficient within organizations and collaboration, and 
disastrous for interpersonal relationships (2006).   
F. CONCLUSION 
Chief executives in high-risk urban areas desire situational awareness and 
knowledge and decision advantages.  This information helps them gauge and 
calibrate appropriate planning, operational, and public responses.  They are 
astute in recognizing that their public appearances at high-profile incidents and 
events is often a way to communicate their accountability to the public.  However, 
chief executives should also recognize that the public wants to trust the 
information it receives, be better informed, be prepared, and to be engaged as a 
trusted partner and not simply to receive directions from the government.  How 
do mayors and governors engage the citizenry and ensure that resources are 
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being directed appropriately?  The next chapter will address the realities that 
chief executives face as the first line of defense against terrorism and other local 
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VI. AVOIDING STRATEGIC SURPRISE/EXAMINING THE 
REALITIES 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
released its security action plan, calling attention to the two “wars” in which 
mayors of large cities found themselves engaged: one against terrorism and the 
threats to their communities, and the other, economic survival (U.S. Conference 
of Mayors, 2001). Nearly eight years after the 9/11 attacks and a global 
recession, localities and states continue to be at the forefront of fighting the dual 
wars, while also fighting violent crime, natural and man-made disasters, and a 
pandemic flu.  Perrow (1999) and Cooper Ramo (2009) perceptively noted that 
individuals are exposed to more crises than ever before because of advancing 
technologies, interdependencies, and an integrated global community.  With 
fewer resources and more security demands, chief executives must not only be 
innovative in their planning but also presciently strategize for the future.   
Feedback from the exploratory interviews yielded insights regarding the 
chief executives’ lack of understanding for their role in the intelligence 
development cycle. Chief executives desire to use fusion center developed 
intelligence to help inform the homeland security program development, the 
annual strategic planning and budgeting process, and how limited resources can 
be optimized through prudent security planning.  This chapter focuses on how 
fusion centers can support mayors and governors by adding value, taking 
advantage of critical opportunities, and providing strategic decision-making 
advantages to them. 
A. HOW RAW ALL-SOURCES INFORMATION BECOMES VALUE-ADDED 
INTELLIGENCE FOR MAYORS AND GOVERNORS  
One of the value propositions of fusion centers is to provide top executives 
with knowledge and decision-making advantages.  Satisfaction of this value 
proposition is in part developed through the intelligence cycle at fusion centers.  
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Yet, according to Rollins (2008), the intelligence cycle is rarely followed in fusion 
centers.  Based on interview responses, the belief is that fusion centers are 
passing along information that is not necessarily based on a defined customer 
need; it is not analyzed or distilled for relevancy, and not tailored in any engaging 
way to the customer’s interest.   
Intelligence experts believe that intelligence is uniquely different from raw 
information that most consumers receive.  Lowenthal asserts that information is 
what is known, regardless of the source, and may be unvetted and unconfirmed, 
and that intelligence is the information that “meets the stated or understood 
needs of the policy maker and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to 
meet those needs” (2006, p. 2).   
Based on interview responses, it appears that mayors and governors are 
not using intelligence as other federal counterpart policy makers who have been 
using intelligence to support their policies and decisions.  Specifically, interviews 
revealed that fusion center intelligence does not meet the executive’s needs.  As 
noted in Chapter IV, local and state executives are not engaging directly with 
their fusion centers, which handicaps fusion centers in identifying policy areas or 
issues of executive interest.  Interview respondents believed that fusion centers 
should know and anticipate the needs and desires of the executive.  Lowenthal 
(2006) and Gookins (2008) note that this is a common belief of senior policy 
makers.   
Once the executive or his or her senior personnel has identified his or her 
intelligence requirements, fusion centers should identify what sources exist that 
already provide relevant data and information.  Many of these data streams and 
information sources already exist in some form in the government, although 
sometimes the difficulty in obtaining the data and information lies with legal and 
policy restrictions and to a lesser degree, technological barriers.   
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The executive should be involved in stressing the importance of 
information sharing within his government and in affirming and establishing clear 
privacy and civil liberties guidelines.  Without strong and sustained oversight, 
abuses may occur.  A recent example is the 2008 Maryland State Police 
surveillance of activists subsequently determined to be acting well within their 
First Amendment rights (Jackson, 2008).  This particular incident drew unwanted 
attention to the executive who was unaware of the state’s intelligence activity.  It 
also suggests that intelligence requirements for collecting information on activists 
were established by an entity that did not understand the executive level’s need 
to know that this activity was being conducted and the political ramifications of 
not having executive and legal oversight.  
The majority of interviews confirm that chief executives do not believe they 
are receiving value-added analysis, synthesis, and forward looking intelligence 
from their fusion centers.  Respondents mentioned that the content of the fusion 
center products on foreign terrorist attacks is not presented in such a way to be 
relevant to the local government’s needs. For example, after the 2008 Islamabad, 
Pakistan attack,5 a flurry of various briefing products and situational alerts were 
sent to customers by fusion centers.  But those products more often than not 
failed to provide assessments of the potential implications for the locality or state.  
A number of interview respondents mentioned getting detailed and updated 
information from CNN and other news media after the attack, suggesting that the 
news media had more insights than the information from their own fusion center.  
However, even after receiving fusion center materials, respondents were not 
given insight to a foreign attack’s implications for the local jurisdiction.  New York 
Police Department’s (NYPD) NYPD Shield provides an example of an effective 
briefing model that points out to the reader what the implications of foreign or 
domestic events are to New York City.   
                                            
5
 Suicide bomb attack by an explosive-filled dump truck occurred in front of the Marriott Hotel 
on September 20, 2008.  Attack occurred few hours after new President Asif Ali Zardari made first 
speech to parliament and was during the Ramadan breakfast. The hotel was adjacent to 
government buildings near Parliament, the President’s house, and the Marriott is a popular locale 
for foreigners and diplomats (Robertson & Vergee, 2008).   
 52 
The one respondent that was unimpressed with the NYPD Shield product 
noted that the information is traditionally entirely drawn from open sources and, 
therefore, was not “intelligence” as defined by Lowenthal (2006).  Thus, value-
added intelligence would have been in the form of information regarding the 
political circumstances leading up to the attack, potential similarities to the 
executive’s jurisdiction, any recommendations for contacting the hotel 
association, private security groups, and identification of any known threats or 
patterns suggesting an attack.   
In providing the political circumstances, the executive can be made aware 
which high-profile political figure is in or traveling through the area or if election 
locations should have increased security.  In the identifying potential similarities, 
what made the targeted area so attractive, and the attack so successful, may be 
compared to the executive’s jurisdiction to determine if preventive measures are 
warranted.  In recommending immediate actions, chief executives can build on or 
develop their relationships with private entities such as hotel owners, 
management, security simply by calling and offering to work together to ensure 
the safety of their customers, business preservation, and thereby the 
preservation of the jurisdiction’s lodging, tourists, and business tax base. In 
identifying known threats and patterns, these are opportunities for the chief 
executive to reflect on the planning and budgeting of resources and activities in 
training, response, and mitigation. 
Absent the value-added intelligence and linkages that are desired by local 
and state chief executives, who are usually under scrutiny as the highest-profile 
elected leaders, Tier 1 UASI located fusion centers are missing opportunities to 
take advantage of the elevated levels of attention, interest, and support after a 
major incident. They are also failing to build value through their inaction just 
when chief executives are ripe for engagement.  The next section explores when 
executives are engaged and how executive offices can leverage those 
opportunities to develop a strategic decision-making advantage. 
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B. DEVELOPING THE STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING ADVANTAGE 
There is generally one period each year when every large city and state 
executive office will be engaged in a sustained amount of their time and energy 
developing, framing, and negotiating on how resources are used in the next year.  
That period is known as the annual budget development process.  Each year, the 
annual budget also becomes the major policy doctrine for cities and states.  As 
the chief executive, mayors and governors shape, develop and execute the 
policies and strategic business plan for their jurisdictions.  Because every locality 
and state has limited resources, a critical component to allocating finite resources 
is in the prioritizing of the executive’s policy interests, particularly during the 
budget development process. The process includes robust reviews, examination, 
and public hearings; executive engagement in negotiations with the legislative 
branch and identification of trade offs that each can agree.  This strategic 
planning process results in the policies and budget to be implemented the 
following fiscal year.   
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Figure 2.   Budget Development Cycle 
As seen in Figure 2, the budget development process involves many 
steps.  The strategic planning process is a political, considered, and collaborative 
approach that is hierarchical (Bryson, 2004). These strategic budgets are 
developed through lengthy planning and robust examination of service delivery, 
effective business processes, and measured against desired outcomes and 
outputs. During the course of such extensive executive reviews, agency 
stakeholders have the opportunity to engage city and state leadership in 
examining previous service performance and to make adjustments to the policy, 
program, or budget as necessary.  This process requires the stakeholders and 
the leadership to be politically astute, rational, and be able to make sound 
 55 
decisions that are meaningful to their jurisdiction (Bryson, 2004).  Thus, mayors 
and governors are usually informed through this process of the revenue they can 
anticipate, performance results of existing services, and the unintentional effects 
of previous policies or new dynamics of a technologically advanced and 
integrated world.  
However, while this budget development process involves many steps, it 
is also limited because of the hierarchical presumptions of how strategy unfolds.  
Strategic planning and budgeting is usually developed with the strong belief that 
an anticipated future environment will not change.  The budget cycle in Figure 2 
shows the limitations of strategic planning: anticipated annual revenue estimates; 
defined agency services; performance and costs of service delivery; and political 
tradeoffs.  While this is conducive to traditional hierarchical strategic planning, it 
is not conducive to adapting to changes in circumstances.  For example, a crisis 
on the scale of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was not factored into the local, state, and 
federal strategic planning process.  Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors released their security action plan, calling attention to the 
two “wars” in which mayors of large cities found themselves engaged: one 
against terrorism and the threats to their communities, and the other, economic 
survival (USCM, 2001).  The effects are realized in the current federal homeland 
security grant program, which almost all jurisdictions rely on exclusively for their 
homeland security programs (National Emergency Management Association, 
2007); a new Department of Homeland Security based on reorganization of 
existing but reluctant functions and agencies; and a multilevel security posture 
that does not appear to be sustainable or adaptable given the economic 
downturn. 
Instead of forcing government agencies to compete for limited resources 
and to maintain a stovepipe agency focus, mayors and governors should 
consider embracing a distribution of responsibility approach where non-
government partners such as the private sector, academia, religious, and civic 
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organizations, and individuals share the responsibility in identifying service needs 
and resources to efficiently meet those needs. 
Fusion centers could potentially help mayors and governors distribute 
responsibility between the government, community, and private sector partners.  
Fusion centers that collaborate with private sector partners may have established 
relationships that mayors and governors can build upon.  They may be best 
positioned to: identify the private and public partners that will help mitigate risks 
and emerging threats, engage the private sector for their capabilities and 
customer service expertise, and develop risk communications for mayors and 
governors to foster citizen information sharing and community preparedness.   
Chief executives would greatly benefit from analysis, insights, and 
actionable intelligence from fusion centers.  They would also benefit from the 
network value of effective fusion centers, both in enlarging the scope of 
information, intelligence, and analyses and achieving collaborative insight and 
assistance to decision making. Through networks, effective fusion centers can 
add value to chief executives’ strategic decision-making advantage by providing 
them with useful intelligence they need and that is relevant to their role.  It should 
also provide mayors and governors with greater flexibility for adapting to changes 
and anticipate surprises. As a dynamic process, consistent fusion center 
briefings and engagement may help chief executives better calibrate their policy 
decisions throughout the year rather than deal with changing circumstances like 
a global recession, shrinking tax base, and security needs a year in advance 
during the time sensitive budget development cycle with limited intelligence. 
C. USING INTELLIGENCE TO INFORM STRATEGIC PLANNING  
As discussed earlier, mayors and governors are informed through the 
strategic planning and budget development process by the revenue they 
anticipate, performance results of existing services, and the unintentional effects 
of previous policies or new technology.  One interview respondent noted a desire 
to have fusion centers provide intelligence products to inform the strategic 
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planning process.  Financial experts provide this information to governments in 
the form of the revenue estimates based on tax receipts.  They monitor economic 
trends of the past and draw conclusions based on global, national, and 
sometimes local, activities to explain the context for the revenue estimates 
(Nathan, 2008).  Some of these activities include policies enacted by the 
administration to raise more revenue, e.g.: increases to the tax base through 
funding or initiatives to improving public school achievements, lowered crime 
rates through increases in police officers or targeted efforts in crime hot spots, 
etc.  
Through their analysis of the outcomes achieved or intended outcomes, 
financial analysts will continuously revise and update their revenue estimates 
throughout the year.  Once revenue estimates have been revealed, they are 
used by the executives as the basis for framing discussions on future policies, 
programs, and spending by the government.  Depending on the methodologies 
used in forecasting, some revenue estimates can also be contentious (Rabin, 
2003).  Nevertheless, financial estimates are adjusted periodically, and at the 
predetermined period in developing the following year’s budget, serve as the 
executive’s basis for the annual strategic planning process. 
Comparable to the revenue estimates process, the federal National 
Intelligence Council produces National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) that are 
considered the intelligence community’s most authoritative written assessment 
for policy makers.  These NIEs are not without controversy.  The most notable 
NIE was issued in 2002 on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, which led to the Iraq 
War and the demise of Saddam Hussein.  Ultimately, the NIE was politically 
manipulated by policy makers as justification for the Iraq War.   
At the local, regional, and state levels, fusion centers produce threat 
assessments for their jurisdictions.  Some produce them on a regular basis while 
others provide them for special events.  Fusion center threat assessments have 
also been under scrutiny.  The Virginia Fusion Center’s threat assessment in 
2009 was criticized for its analysis on educational and religious institutions as 
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breeding grounds for terrorist activities.  The appearance of intruding on the First 
Amendment rights of Virginians was quickly addressed by the Virginia governor 
in the announcement of an investigation into the “methodologies and process” 
involved in producing the report (Kaine, 2009). This response by the chief 
executive suggests that the intelligence requirements were established by an 
entity that was not politically astute enough to inform the executive, and did not 
recognize the complex operating environment the executive must lead.  
As noted in Chapter IV, insights from the author’s exploratory interviews 
revealed that fusion centers are not able to produce local threat assessments 
very well.  The lack of relevancy to the jurisdiction, lack of timeliness, and lack of 
actionable intelligence make their generic products overall unsatisfactory to 
executives.   
Lowenthal outlines three critical factors for intelligence (2006).  He asserts 
that intelligence helps to avoid strategic surprise, provides for long-term 
intelligence expertise to term-limited chief executives, and supports the policy 
development process.  At the first annual National Fusion Center Conference, 
Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security advised 
participants that intelligence is viewed as “an early warning system that allows 
public safety officials to get a jump on the adversary” (Rollins, 2008, p. 5).  The 
National Strategy for Information Sharing (White House, 2007) outlines five uses 
of information: (1) prevention of terrorist attacks; (2) critical infrastructure 
protection and resilience planning; (3) prioritizing management, response, and 
recovery to crises; (4) develop training and exercises; and (5) allocation of 
resources. 
The potential of fusion centers is in their ability to provide intelligence that 
can help the executive better understand the security risks and vulnerabilities in 
communities.  This helps chief executives make informed decisions, build in 
resources to allow adaptability, and identify the level of political capital necessary 
during budget negotiations with the legislative branch.  Ultimately, the better the  
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executive is able to grasp this information, the better informed he or she will be in 
developing policies, budgeting and planning to prioritize investments in 
addressing security risks and vulnerabilities. 
D. IMPACT OF CLASSIFIED AND “NEED TO KNOW” INFORMATION ON 
LOCAL AND STATE EXECUTIVES 
The majority of respondents were concerned with the classification of 
materials that prevent their timely review or prevent their sharing of the 
information with people who are not cleared to receive it.  Several examples from 
the interviews revealed a disturbing reality of how some federal authorities are 
still unable to accept local and state authorities as partners in information 
sharing.  One respondent recounted a nationwide gathering of non-federal senior 
personnel representing their jurisdiction with a cabinet secretary and was told 
they would receive a Top Secret classified briefing; yet only a handful were able 
to attend because of their security clearance level.  Another senior level 
respondent noted that because he was not cleared to receive Secret level 
classified information, he was prevented from receiving classified information.  A 
third respondent indicated that a request for information by their fusion center 
was rebuffed by the FBI field office because there was not a “need to know” for 
the locality or state.  These responses suggest that federal authorities are still in 
control of intelligence and local and state executives cannot designate senior 
personnel to represent their interest unless they are cleared by the federal 
security clearance process, approved by the federal government to handle 
sensitive federal information, and deemed by the FBI to have a “need to know” 
for the information requested. 
With the establishment of over 70 fusion centers, localities and states 
attempted to find their own solution to the lack of federal intelligence sharing.  
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the national efforts to change the federal 
level information sharing paradigm from “need to know” to “responsibility to 
share” has not been as effective from the local and state perspective.  Even with 
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the release of the National Strategy for Information Sharing document in 2007, 
the treatment of and trust displayed toward local and state partners has been 
mixed.   
Respondents revealed in Chapter IV their suspicions that FBI field offices 
were reluctant to share information with local and state officials who were not law 
enforcement, and additional private conversations with individuals validated 
those suspicions.  If FBI field offices continue to challenge local and state officials 
in preserving their “need to know” perspective rather than the “responsibility to 
share,” it remains to be seen if there will be a true paradigm shift as called for in 
the 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Protection Act, 2007 NSIS, and most recently, the 2008 U.S. 
Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy. 
Although the NSIS addresses the need for local and state officials to 
access information to protect their communities and acknowledges that localities 
and states are “often best able to identify potential threats that exist within their 
jurisdictions,” its lack of progress demonstrates the hollowness of federal level 
partnership, prevents effective collaboration, and erodes trust (White House, 
2007, p. 3). 
The need for secrecy and sensitivity of information sources and methods 
is understandably important to national security, and there is no argument for 
sharing sources and methods with state and local partners.  At a basic level, the 
federal classification system, the federal control of access to it, and when it can 
be accessed is perceived by local and state officials as a form of distrust in 
localities and states and a lack of appreciation for their frontline role in securing 
the nation, which further widens the trust gap between the federal government 
and local and state executives.   
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E. CONCLUSION 
Chief executives want to avoid surprises and be able to anticipate them.  
They do this by demanding their staff have situational awareness to avoid 
strategic surprises.  There is also an expectation that federal partners will share 
information with local and state authorities rather than continue to hide behind 
the “need to know” philosophy.  Only then will fusion centers be able to deliver 
intelligence, analysis that is relevant, useful, and engaging to mayors and 
governors information.  Ultimately, the consistent dynamic interaction with fusion 
centers should bring value to chief executives by helping them to calibrate their 
decisions daily and throughout the year, rather than the rigid once a year 
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VII. PREPARING THE DECISION MAKER 
[Directorate of Intelligence] analysts did not have the foggiest 
notion of what I did; and I did not have a clue as to what they could 
or should do. (Blackwill, A Policy Maker’s Perspective on 
intelligence Analysis, 2008, p. 154) 
The role of intelligence is to inform the decision-making process, support 
the policies, and provide knowledge and decision advantages for the policy 
maker (Gookins, 2008).  As noted in Chapter I, the overarching goal of the fusion 
center should be to help the decision maker prepare for the operating 
environment of the city or state.  When information is credible and relevant to the 
chief executive, it can be extremely advantageous.  Chapter V illuminated the 
methods and measures that chief executives employ, and the exploratory 
interviews conducted for this research reveal a desire for situational awareness 
on issues of executive interest at all times.   
Mayors and governors, as the key decision makers for their jurisdictions, 
demand a set of tools and processes to help them access distilled, relevant 
information when they want and need it.  The private sector does this in ways 
that allow business executives to identify the most cost efficient and marketable 
information that helps the business meet the need and demands of their 
customers.  Physicians also use a similar model in the testing and assessments 
and the health records of patients to identify the right course of action.  Another 
model to review is the Presidential Daily Briefings and the presentations by the 
Director of National Intelligence.  Senior staff personnel play a significant role, 
based on the interview results, in either serving as the firewall or as a conduit of 
fusion intelligence for the executive. 
The following sections give insight to the Presidential Daily Briefings as an 
example of the key policy maker involved in the intelligence development 
process, the role of the DNI and senior personnel, and the decision-making 
process.   
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A. PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFINGS 
The Director of Intelligence is the coordinator and approver of the 
Presidential Daily Briefings (PDB) the President receives.  PDBs are summaries 
of high interest intelligence reports, delivered each working day by the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI).  The goal, according to a taped interview with a CIA 
briefer, is to produce a daily report that is like a current intelligence newspaper 
(Edwards, 2004).  Sometimes the DNI briefings are not decision or action 
documents, but are new items of intelligence information or updates of a previous 
briefing or a response to a request.  Because of the sensitivity of the classified 
intelligence, distribution of PDBs are closely controlled and limited to only few 
policy makers, including the Vice President, Secretary of State, Defense 
Secretary, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the FBI Director, National Security 
Council, etc. (Edwards, 2004).   
On a daily basis, the President is directly engaged with the IC through the 
DNI and receives continuous input from his intelligence officer.  Prior to the 
establishment of the DNI in 2005 and U.S. intelligence reforms, daily intelligence 
summaries were provided to the President and his advisors beginning in the 
Kennedy Presidency (Kovar, 2007).  These were compiled as a direct result of 
the executive’s need for readable summaries tailored from synthesized disparate 
sources of intelligence that were often duplicative reporting.  The PDB and 
similar briefings continues to evolve with each Presidency based on the 
President’s style, preferences, and interests.  The most recent evolution of 
intelligence briefings is the classified Economic Intelligence Briefing requested by 
officials in the Obama administration, signaling the need for better understanding 
of the global economic crisis and its impact (Kingsbury, 2009). 
There is historical evidence that each President, except for George H. W. 
Bush who was CIA director in his earlier career, had to overcome an initial lack of 
familiarity with intelligence briefings prior to his inauguration (Kovar, 2007).  This 
occurred prior to the inauguration owing to relatively few constraints on the 
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President-elect’s time.  Briefers were able to develop briefing relationships and 
determine style, preference, and interests to engage the primary customer.  They 
also provided insights to incoming Presidents who were curious about current 
events and their relevancy to the U.S. and U.S. policies.  This national 
intelligence practice of tailoring products focusing on end user satisfaction is a 
standard practice for how intelligence services support policy makers.  This 
practice is, unfortunately, lacking for local chief executives representing the 
highest risk Tier 1 UASI areas.    
The August 6, 2001 PDB titled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.,” 
represents the most dramatic tension between intelligence to support the policy 
maker and the course of action to take once the executive has the knowledge 
and decision advantage.  The Bush Administration’s claim was that the briefing 
memo did not provide actionable details (”Transcript,” 2004).  The President 
notably said that the briefing did not tell him who, what, where, and where the 
attacks would occur.  The memo attempts to provide the information on the first 
three questions but does not provide additional details for when the attacks may 
occur.  Local and state executives might ask the same question given this 
briefing memo.  Without actual details and specifics, such as who, what, where, 
and when, a briefing becomes informational and not an actionable brief.  
Meanwhile, the role of the briefer could have included sharing the intelligence 
with other policy makers prior to the President’s briefing in order to prepare 
actionable options for the President and who present those options to him.  The 
next section addresses the role of the Director of National Intelligence. 
B. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
Created as a result of the 9/11 Commission recommendations to reform 
the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the 
nation’s top intelligence officer and reports directly to the President. Under the 
Obama Administration, the President receives an intelligence brief and an 
economic brief delivered each day by the DNI.  The product is a collaborative 
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effort of the intelligence community and overseen by the DNI (Hosenball, 2009). 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 outlined 
responsibilities of the DNI, including: the role of primary intelligence briefer to the 
President and other policy makers; setting the goals and priorities for national 
intelligence; developing an information-sharing environment; developing the 
National Intelligence Program budget; working with foreign intelligence services; 
ensuring accuracy of all sources of intelligence analysis; establishing personnel 
policies and programs for joint operations and staffing; and working with the 
Secretary of Defense for purchasing major systems (Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, n.d.). 
DNI Dennis Blair has sought to approach the top intelligence officer role 
as a partner with the agencies comprising the intelligence community.  His efforts 
to work with other policy makers to anticipate questions, and develop action 
steps before the briefings for the President, serve as a good example for 
preparing briefings for local and state executives.  In a recent interview, Blair 
suggested, “Raw data are of little use unless they can be a foundation for a 
course of action,” and he further noted that intelligence should be useful to the 
President (Kingsbury, 2009).  To Blair, intelligence should be presented with a 
defensive and offensive perspective with every analysis on important issues to 
include both a threat and opportunity section so that the primary executive has 
the knowledge and decision advantage (Kingsbury, 2009).   
Given the demands and needs of local and state chief executives 
discussed in Chapter V, it behooves them to heed the example of the nation’s 
Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in setting time each morning to expect 
and receive critical briefings.  Fusion centers should also apply the lessons from 
DNI Blair in the prescience and anticipation he undertakes in the preparation of 
intelligence for the decision maker.  By receiving a briefing that anticipates the 
chief executive’s questions and addresses his or her potential concerns, mayors 
and governors can take the necessary course of action or maintain a knowledge 
and decision advantage. 
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C SIGNIFICANCE OF SENIOR STAFF TO CHIEF EXECUTIVES 
As noted in Chapter V, chief executives have an impossible to fulfill 
expectation of knowing everything that is occurring in their jurisdictions.  They 
typically rely on a small group of senior personnel to provide them with 
“situational awareness.”  This reliance on staff is based on a level of trust and 
familiarity that allows for free exchange of information, and a better 
understanding of the executive’s interests, style, and preferences for receiving 
information.  To have information the executive expects ready whenever the 
executive wants it requires senior personnel to obtain information based on their 
anticipation of the executive’s interests and requests, the opportunity to present 
it, and the connecting of information between political, policy, budget, and 
practical implications (Tropp, 1974). 
Respondents from the Tier 1 UASI regions held significant positions and 
portfolios, representing the trust their chief executive has in them.  Yet, they also 
exerted significant control over the information flow between fusion centers and 
the executives. They either serve as the conduit for or firewall preventing 
information flow. As the conduit, the one respondent that had positive 
interactions with his fusion centers regularly engaged and established executive 
expectations for the fusion center.  For respondents who were not satisfied with 
their fusion center services, their insights suggested that they were not confident 
enough with the fusion centers’ capability to ensure that the executive’s time was 
well spent in a briefing produced by the fusion center.   
Thus, the engagement between chief executives and their fusion centers 
was decidedly mixed to nonexistent; and, consequently, the value of the fusion 
center to the chief executive was nil.  Likewise, the value of senior personnel 
close to the chief executive providing the fusion center with insight to the chief 
executive’s needs thereby improving fusion center services was lost. This is 
another dimension to the failure of some chief executives and fusion centers to 
engage mutually. 
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As noted in Chapters V and VI, trust is critical to mutual engagement of 
individuals and organizations.  The more interaction, the more familiar, and the 
more consistent the exchange of information becomes. If the exchange of 
information is determined to be consistently accurate or correct, trust in that 
information and source can be established.  Interview responses suggest that 
senior personnel interacting with the fusion centers feel that fusion centers are 
not living up to their potential in generating intelligence.  One respondent said his 
fusion center regularly passes information on from other sources without any 
significant relevancy noted to their jurisdiction or environment. Without 
establishing trust with designated senior personnel, it becomes harder to engage 
directly with chief executives. 
D. POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
The concerns that political manipulation of intelligence will occur if mayors 
and governors are engaged in the intelligence development process are tenuous.  
If anything, the lack of chief executive oversight has caused fusion centers to 
continue to focus their efforts on operational and tactical needs of law 
enforcement.  This can result in somewhat overlapping and duplication of 
missions with the local law enforcement agency and tends to narrow the fusion 
center’s perspective and negate non-law enforcement agency participation in the 
intelligence process.   
As seen in the Texas, Virginia, and Maryland examples, intelligence 
requirements and collection operations were developed without benefit of review 
and guidance from the executive level, resulting in activity of questionable legality 
and raising concerns of First Amendment rights violations.  Activity in those 
states left the chief executives no alternative but to launch internal investigations 
on intelligence collection policies to reestablish the public trust.  As noted in 
Chapter VI, chief executives are faced with a complex operating environment and 
are attuned to identifying issues that are political.  Their executive oversight can 
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help steer fusion centers away from questionable practices, establish 
safeguards, and produce guidelines for intelligence operations. 
Another dimension of fusion centers with respect to politicization is the 
potential influence of the host department’s leadership on what the fusion center 
produces and how information is presented to external customers.  There may be 
an aversion to fusion center products, which expose information that is potentially 
embarrassing, or that could result in criticism of the host department’s 
effectiveness.   
In all of considerations of politicization, it is important for a fusion center to 
have some independence from host agency influence and to have the support of 
a strong governance and oversight body.  As one interview respondent noted in 
the interview response, when the high personnel costs for an event did not 
correspond with low threat assessment conducted by the same agency, the gap 
between intelligence and the effects on their resources can be easily 
manipulated by the host department. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals that the President, arguably one of the busiest and 
high profile chief executives in the world, receives daily intelligence briefings to 
enhance his situational awareness.  Why are mayors and governors not learning 
from this example and experience?  What is keeping them from spending 
important time each day to receive regular intelligence updates?  In all likelihood, 
they may not be aware that such capability exists and that it might be found in 
their fusion centers.  The value added in effective fusion centers is in their ability 
to deliver strategic decision-making advantage to the chief executive.  Senior 
personnel who are engaged with fusion centers may need to go through an 
executive requirements session to identify what is important to the executive.  If 




excellent briefer is identified; and if daily executive briefings are delivered to their 
satisfaction, senior personnel become a conduit for information flow, then chief 
executives may soon realize what they have been missing. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
We can succeed only by concert. It is not "can any of us imagine 
better,” but "can we all do better?" The dogmas of the quiet past 
are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high 
with difficulty, and we must rise—with the occasion. As our case is 
new, so we must think anew, and act anew [Abraham Lincoln, 
address to Congress in 1862]. (Phillips, 1993, p. 137) 
This research leads to the conclusion that a significant number of mayors 
and governors of high threat, high population density urban areas are not directly 
and regularly engaging their fusion centers.  Exploratory research also reveals 
that a significant number of mayors and governors, as the primary policy and 
decision makers for their jurisdictions, do not believe their fusion center is of 
value to them.  During troubling economic times, mayors and governors who 
represent high threat and high population density urban areas may need to justify 
sustaining fusion centers to their constituency and to the federal government.  
With over 70 fusion centers established nationwide and over $340 million dollars 
in federal grant funds and local and state funds invested in this local, regional, 
and state endeavor to support policy makers and other local and state agencies, 
the lack of engagement between chief executives and fusion centers needs to be 
course corrected.  The following recommendations (Table 2) are proposed to 
help fusion centers deliver value in the form of knowledge and decision 
advantages to chief executives.  
Table 2.   Recommendations 
Recommendations 
A. Engage Mayors and Governors 
B. Develop Executive Products and Services 
C. Identify an Intelligence Translator 
D. Educate Executives on the Intelligence Development Cycle 
E. Explain Fusion Center Limitations 
F. Proposed Value Innovation Framework 
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A. ENGAGE MAYORS AND GOVERNORS 
Fusion centers should meet the needs of their customers, especially chief 
executives of large urban areas.  In order to appropriately address executive 
needs, fusion centers should identify key senior personnel who can provide 
insights to the executive’s interests, style, and preferences for receiving 
information.  Senior personnel can either become conduits of information or 
barriers preventing the information flow.  The challenge for fusion centers will be 
to establish familiarity with their capabilities and an ability to adapt collection, 
analysis, production, and services to meet the needs and interests of the staff 
who serve the chief executive.  The more consistent the exchange of information, 
and when the more accuracy or usefulness of the information is demonstrated, 
the more trust and engagement will develop. 
B. DEVELOP EXECUTIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
In serving the chief executive’s needs, fusion centers must find ways to 
innovate in their provision of intelligence.  Major competitors are 24-hour cycle 
news media and social media networks for fast-breaking and developing events.  
Leveraging technology like Twitter or Facebook may be one method to compete 
in the provision of “current intelligence,” but the higher value fusion centers can 
bring is making sense of if or how events impact the chief executive’s jurisdiction.  
Fusion centers should leverage their resources to validate what is happening, 
reducing the initial period of uncertainty, and to develop the context for what is 
happening in their local jurisdictions.  The chief executives’ needs and interests 
in this respect require knowing the style and preferences of executives in general 
and delivering products and services tailored appropriately.   
C. IDENTIFY AN INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATOR 
A key aspect to engaging the executive is to be able to translate or frame 
the intelligence for the executive to understand the information they are 
receiving.  A critical factor in developing executive focused products and services 
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is to tailor the intelligence to their needs and interests.  Executives do not need 
the same scope of information or details as other customers.  Their needs are 
unique, time-limited, and their interests are wide ranging.  Chief executives 
should have briefings or other products that are exclusive to them, their 
language, and can help them understand how the intelligence can support future 
policies or actions.  Having an intelligence translator or a rotation of intelligence 
briefers trained to the same standards to brief the executive and providing 
regular briefings will help the executive become more familiar with the process. 
D. EDUCATE EXECUTIVES ON THE INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT 
CYCLE 
The majority of interview results did not reflect executive involvement in 
developing, stating, or levying intelligence and policy needs.  In order to identify 
policy issues or areas that chief executives need and desire, they must be 
educated in the intelligence development process.  This can best be achieved 
through discussions with senior personnel who interact with the executive on a 
regular basis.  Insight to the executive’s interests can also be found in the 
policies introduced, legislation developed, announcements made through 
websites, interviews, and other sources reflecting the executive’s priorities in the 
context of the jurisdiction’s environment. 
E. EXPLAIN FUSION CENTER LIMITATIONS 
Fusion centers must not oversell their capabilities.  They must make their 
capabilities and limitations known to temper executive expectations. In explaining 
what can and cannot be accomplished and why, fusion centers can also illustrate 
to the chief executive what additional capabilities they need in order to be 
successful in adding value for the chief executive.  In establishing needed 
additional capabilities, fusion centers are also helping to identify their resource 
needs to meet the executive’s demands. 
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F. PROPOSED VALUE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK 
Table 3.   Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid (after Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
Eliminate 
 
• Bureaucratic layers 
• “Need to Know” mentality  
Raise 
 
• Information sharing culture 
• Collaboration with public 
Reduce 
 
• Information sharing restrictions 




• Risk sharing approach 
• Public trust and confidence  
 
The following proposal incorporates a Blue Ocean Strategy framework for 
fusion centers to be a value innovation for mayors and governors (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005).  In order to create the value innovation in fusion centers, 
Table 3 borrows the four actions concept offered by the Blue Ocean Strategy and 
identifies the issues based on interviews on improving fusion center value to 
eliminate, reduce, and the values to raise, and create.  
Table 3 reflects the research and exploratory interview results which 
indicate that current fusion centers are not providing the executive with 
intelligence relevant to adaptive government behavior and policies and are not 
providing added value to chief executives.  The strategy canvas (Figure 3) shows 
a “before” and “after” fusion center based on the four actions in Table 3.  Current 
fusion centers represent the “before” perspective that delivers low value to chief 
executives in the following areas: bureaucratic layers in the classification 
process, detrimental “need to know” culture, federal interference by withholding 
of information or lack of timeliness in sharing information, restrictions on 
information sharing with others who do not have clearances, stovepiping 
intelligence solely for law enforcement purposes, and not providing an all 
hazards perspective.   
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Fusion centers supporting mayors and governors represent the “after” 
perspective of fusion centers delivering the value proposition to chief executives.  
This includes the types of information that help shape government policies and 
change behaviors, increases the executive’s opportunities to collaborate with the 
public, provide the executive with risk-sharing approaches with non-government 
partners, and increases the public’s trust and confidence.  The effect of the 
proposed value innovation framework is seen in the strategy canvas where, 
ultimately, mayors and governors finally receive the value added support they 
need to lead and operate in their jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 3.   Strategy Canvas: Fusion Center Value for Mayors and Governors 
Fusion centers must be adaptive and responsive to change, especially 
now given the low perception of value of fusion centers uncovered in this 
research.  Beyond adapting, they must make themselves indispensable in the 
chief executives’ arsenal of situational awareness tools and demonstrate 
irrefutable credibility, reliability, objectivity, and capability to help translate 
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mundane intelligence into engaging knowledge and decision-making advantage 
for chief executives. Furthermore, fusion centers must help mayors and 
governors develop a risk sharing approach with an engaged public and achieve 




If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less 
[Eric Shinseki, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff]. (Peters, 2003, p. 3)  
This thesis provides, through exploratory interviews, insights to the Tier 1 
UASI chief executives’ current level of engagement and satisfaction with their 
fusion centers.  It also offers a view of the executive’s approach to daily tactical 
and long-term strategic planning, and how information and intelligence is usually 
obtained by the executive office, from existing sources and presentation formats 
established by the executive.   
While local and state chief executives are at the forefront of defending the 
nation, they also find themselves confronted with tremendous fiscal pressures, 
increasing demands for human services, local and regional crime, natural 
disasters, an aggressive new media, and an increasingly technologically astute 
political observing and reporting community.  The demands on their time and 
leadership are much higher than were on their counterparts a decade ago.  While 
the tools that exist today have the means to help local and state leaders, the 
proliferation of fusion centers and their evolution continues to suggest that they 
have yet to define or realize their full potential and value.  Mayors and governors 
representing the highest risk urban areas should have the means for directly 
engaging with their fusion centers with a full and justified expectation of receiving 
the information they need for decision making and effective governing.  
The key to answering part of the thesis topic, Tell Me What I Need to 
Know, is specific to the executive based on his or her personality, style, and 
interest level. It is also almost entirely dependent on the observant senior 
personnel close to the chief executive who are willing to offer meaningful, 




the thesis topic, What Mayors and Governors Want from their Fusion Center, 
depends on the requirements and policy questions directly provided by the 
executive or through observant, knowledgeable senior personnel.  
What can be learned about the value of fusion centers, from the 
perspective of chief executives whose jurisdictions encompass major, high threat 
urban areas?  The chief executive should be the most important political/policy 
level customer.  However, while executive support is a high priority mission, it 
should not be the only fusion center mission.  The fusion center should also 
serve other departments’ needs.   
Exploratory interviews reveal that the majority mayors and governors of 
Tier 1 UASI jurisdictions want to avoid surprises and be positioned to anticipate 
changes in their operating environment.  However, such chief executives do not 
regularly engage with and do not find satisfaction in their fusion centers.  The 
disconnect lies in the lack of familiarity with their fusion centers and their 
capabilities, and the arrangement chief executives have or do not have in place 
for engagement with the fusion centers.   
As noted in earlier chapters, a significant number of fusion centers are all 
hazards and all crimes focused, are typically led by law enforcement agencies, 
and do not have a global all hazards perspective.  This makes them self-limiting 
and open to criticism, and for some, may lead to eventual failure.  Fusion centers 
that have evolved towards an all-hazards focus but, under the oversight of law 
enforcement authorities, may continue to struggle in achieving their broader, all-
hazards mission given the focus of law enforcement agencies who desire tactical 
support for their all crimes mission.   
Responses by senior personnel on behalf of their chief executives 
demonstrated that they were the most familiar executive level persons with the 
fusion center and served as either the firewall or conduit between the executive 
and their fusion centers.  If the fusion services and products were perceived as 
irrelevant or of poor quality and did not provide added value for the executive, the 
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firewall was in place to prevent the busy executive wasting time.  If the services 
and products were perceived as useful and insightful, the conduit existed to allow 
information to flow to the executive.   
Significantly, responses also revealed that senior personnel were not 
satisfied with fusion center services.  Responses reflected general sentiments 
that the services were not tailored for the executive’s needs, information was not 
relevant to the executive’s purview and jurisdictions, and other news media 
sources were providing real-time and competing information, which make fusion 
center services and products inferior and irrelevant. Additional concerns 
regarding federal level classifications preventing information sharing and limiting 
access were expressed, which suggested that the information sharing 
environment set forth by the National Strategy for Information Sharing has not 
been successful. 
The revelation that senior personnel served as either the firewall or 
conduit for assessing and deciding executive engagement of fusion centers led 
to additional research on how the President is served by the Director of National 
Intelligence today and by the Director of Central Intelligence prior to 
establishment of the DNI position. Insights from this model and the role of senior 
personnel formed the recommendations for this research.  Recommendations 
include developing a trusting relationship with the executive’s senior personnel in 
order to leverage the conduit for conveying information to the executive.  By 
using the senior personnel to identify the executive’s policy interests and by 
educating those staff officials in the intelligence development cycle and the need 
for their involvement to understand the executive’s personality and style, fusion 
centers can develop the appropriate means for delivering value added 
information and intelligence services and sustain their programs. 
The key role of intelligence is to inform the decision-making process, 
support policy execution, and provide knowledge and decision advantages for 
the policy maker.  As noted in Chapter If, the ultimate goal of the fusion center is 
to help the decision maker prepare for interacting within the operating 
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environment of the city or state.  Fusion centers, if fully engaged by their mayors 
and governors, should add value by providing strategic decision-making 
advantages to chief executives.   
To achieve value innovation, chief executives and fusion centers should 
build towards more risk sharing with the public, involve it in developing methods 
for preventing crises, and establish public trust and confidence in the intelligence 
gained and risk and crisis information shared. 
Local and state governments have been under tremendous strain and 
pressure to seek for ways to balance their budgets while sustaining their local 
needs and security demands.  The federal government has begun to look for 
ways to reduce costs of entitlement programs and other grant programs.  As 
noted in the first chapter of this thesis, almost all states rely on federal homeland 
security grants for sustaining major aspects of their jurisdiction’s homeland 
security programs.  All levels of government will be reevaluating inefficient 
programs and fusion centers may not survive the next evolution if mayors and 
governors continue to perceive them as not adding value to their prevention of 
terrorism and threats.  Fusion centers may be at significant risk of being 
eliminated if they fail to adapt to the specific needs, requirements, styles, and 
personalities of their mayors and governors.  Ultimately, fusion centers need to 
resonate with and be responsive to the needs of their chief executives or become 
irrelevant to policy makers. 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
As noted in the research design, exploratory interviews of Tier 1 UASI 
executive offices should only serve as a beginning point to understanding the 
current level of chief executive engagement and satisfaction with fusion centers.  
The narrow scope of this research does not address all other issues regarding 
the capabilities of fusion centers to provide adequate and value added services 
to the key policy makers and operational entities they serve.  Future research 
should include direct feedback from chief executives on their engagement of 
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fusion centers, gauging executive reception of fusion center services, and the 
uses of the intelligence to support policies and decisions.   
Another area for future research should include measurements of the 
satisfaction with services.  While it is evident that the lack of executive 
engagement contributes to the inadequacy of fusion center services for the 
executive, future research should also identify the appropriate level of fusion 
staffing and funding to ensure that executive needs are met.   
Further research on how localities and states rate the federal efforts since 
the release of the National Strategy for Information Sharing could identify the 
gaps preventing effective collaboration and trust building among partners working 
with fusion centers.  
A study about how to groom effective fusion center leaders, including 
executive level development, organizational behavior, business and client 
relationships, classification issues, effective intelligence analysis, and reporting is 
needed to ensure that fusion centers are sustainable.   
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following questions were directed to Tier 1 UASI mayors and 
governors, and their senior staff, through email and phone interviews. 
The services that a fusion center provides include, but are not limited to, 
the following: face-to-face briefings, tailored threat assessments, first alert 
reporting, intelligence preparation of the city’s environment.  Given this context: 
1. Are you a direct consumer of fusion center information?  
2. Do you receive regular fusion center briefings?  Do you read their 
products?  
3. What types of information do you regularly receive in briefings? On 
what did you expect to be briefed?  
4. How often do you actively request information from the fusion 
center?  What types of information have you requested?   
5. If you have provided feedback to the fusion center, what types of 
feedback did you provide?   
6. Have you received tailored products or briefings as a result of 
earlier feedback?  Were you satisfied with the product or briefing? 
7. Have you expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the level of 
information received from the fusion center?  Please provide 
examples of satisfactory or unsatisfactory information, services, or 
products. 
8. Are there examples of when fusion produced intelligence has 
assisted in a policy decision, help shape policies, planning, and 
budgets?  Please provide examples. 
9. Does it matter to you if the briefings are at the classified or 
unclassified level?  Why? 
10. What type of information and products are you interested in 
receiving from the fusion center?  For example: key international 
events, coast-to-coast U.S. events, select IC analysis on terrorism 
and global economic intelligence, terrorist attacks on global 
infrastructure, etc.   
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11. What if anything, does your fusion center need to do to be of value 
to you in making key decisions about homeland security plans, 
preventions, and responses?   
12. What do you see as the future of your fusion center?   
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW RESPONSE HIGHLIGHTS 
Questions Highlights of Responses 
• Are you a direct consumer 
of fusion center 
information?  
5 yes, 1 no. 
• Do you receive regular 
fusion center briefings?   
• Read their products?  
• 5 yes, 1 no. 
 
• 5 yes, 1 no. 
• What types of information 






• What do you expect to be 
briefed on but have not?  
• Receive Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) info, 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR), Terrorist 
Screening Center (TSC) hits, local crime data, health 
and fire arson indicators, chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE), 
international and domestic attack information.   
 
• Have not received linkages of info to local and 
regional issues; have not received analytical patterns 
and information.  
• How often do you actively 
request information from the 
fusion center?   
• What types of information 
have you requested?   
• Responses ranged from never to request for weekly 
and annual info. 
 
• Requests include: H1N1; general public health 
information; workplace violence; Islamabad attacks; 
Mumbai attacks; relevancy of international 
incidences to local jurisdictions; stolen government 
vehicles and property trend; nexus to terrorism; 
classified briefings; SAR trends; regional gang 
information; property foreclosure data and 
connection to crime; and annual threat assessment. 
If you have provided feedback 
to the fusion center, what 
types of feedback did you 
provide?   
One respondent said “none except for appreciation.”  
Other responses included phrases such as “relevancy”, 
“What’s the value added?” “How is this different form 
CNN or other media sources?”   
 
General responses indicated need for timeliness, 
synthesis.  Information is transactional and not 
revelatory or actionable with recommendations.  Need 
for specificity not generalities.  Lack of connection to 
day-to-day issues such as crime patterns and local 
threats or risks. Need more tactical and strategic info 
on attacks overseas. Don’t overload, overwhelm the 
reader with general information they already know.  
Highlight unique information to set it apart from other 
channels, such as 24-hour news media; economic 
briefings for their jurisdictions. 
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• Have you received tailored 
products or briefings as a 
result of earlier feedback?   
• Were you satisfied with the 
product or briefing? 
• One respondent said they received a briefing on an 
overseas incident after an initial fusion center 
briefing. 
• All but 2 responses said they were generally 
dissatisfied with products and briefings 
• Have you expressed 
satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the level 
of information received from 





• Please provide examples of 
satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory information, 
services or products. 
• Only one specific response was provided about how 
satisfied they and their executive were with the level 
of information provided by their fusion center.  Other 
general responses: information was not specific to 
the target audience; information developed as 
general fit-all and not tailored; concerns that the 
fusion center was focused on information that was 
not what the executive requested 
 
• Daily summaries and briefings were too general. 
Are there examples of when 
fusion produced intelligence 
has assisted in a policy 
decision, help shape policies, 
planning and budgets?  
Please provide examples. 
Responses included a lack of understanding for the 
executive’s environment and purview; gap existed 
between threat assessment and asset deployment; 
information on mitigating vulnerabilities would inform 
policies.  Lack of timing in providing information 
negatively impacted ability to plan ahead on budgets 
and strategy 
Does it matter to you if the 
briefings are at the classified 
or unclassified level?  Why? 
All but 2 respondents said they wanted classified 
information because it might include higher level of 
detail.  One respondent said the lack of useful 
information from classified side suggested lack of 
collaboration or trust in information sharing between 
federal and local fusion center.   Three respondents 
said that they believe the FBI field offices withheld 
information from their fusion centers.  One respondent 
wanted information on classified level as a courtesy 
notification to the chief executive.  Another respondent 
did not have clearance to receive classified level 
briefings.  One respondent indicated that a request for 
information from their fusion center was rebuffed by the 
FBI because there was not a “need to know” for the 
locality or state.  Another respondent said “how do I 
know what I don’t know?”  One respondent indicated 
that the quality of classified information was a let down 




What type of information and 
products are you interested in 
receiving from the fusion 
center?  For example: key 
international events, coast-to-
coast U.S. events, select IC 
analysis on terrorism and 
global economic intelligence, 
terrorist attacks on global 
infrastructure, etc.   
Responses included: risk and crisis information that 
can be shared with the public; non-law enforcement 
centric information; federal intelligence; local economic 
indicators; critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and 
mitigation strategies; not pass through regurgitation of 
federal products and analysis but implications and 
specificity to locality and state; international and US 
events, particularly specific threats to cities, ports, and 
airports in the U.S.. 
What if anything, does your 
fusion center need to do to be 
of value to you in making key 
decisions about homeland 
security plans, preventions, 
and responses? 
Responses included: to provide information that is 
relevant to jurisdiction; to have specific information; to 
provide true fusion and analysis of data and not just 
pass unsynthesized information on; become useful to 
the chief executive; provide predictive information that 
can influence government actions, planning, 
prevention, and response. 
 
One respondent said it has strong value and is already 
integrated very well into the workings of the jurisdiction. 
What do you see as the future 
of your fusion center?  
Responses included: hoping fusion centers become 
valuable to executive in that he or she receives regular 
briefings; flow intelligence from local level up to federal 
level; central point for information analysis and 
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